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SOLIDIFYING SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY
Judge Leslie A. Gardner* and Justin C. Van Orsdol**

ABSTRACT
States have often taken different approaches to polarizing issues such as the
legalization of marijuana, voting rights, and gun safety. Generally, the federal government has stayed out of the fray honoring the concept of the “states as laboratories.”
That is, until recently. With increasing debate among political leaders and diverging
viewpoints among Department of Justice officials, clashes between federal officers
and state governments have increased. But what happens to a federal officer caught
in the crossfire, charged by a state prosecutor for breaking state criminal law while
attempting to enforce federal law? The answer lies in the doctrine of Supremacy
Clause immunity. As the issue has seldom arisen, scholarship and case law on the
subject is limited. In light of the rise in federal-state disputes, and considering the competing constitutional concerns and the criminal charges federal officers could face,
a solidified framework for handling these types of cases is desperately needed. Moreover, these cases often involve motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(6), which presents a unique procedural question: whether a judge or
jury should decide disputed issues of material fact. We propose a framework wherein
juries should decide disputed issues of material fact in Supremacy Clause immunity
cases. Further, we propose a Supremacy Clause immunity test that more thoroughly
defines when (1) a federal officer is authorized by federal law to take certain actions,
and (2) when a federal officer’s actions are “necessary and proper.” While our proposals do not solve every foreseeable problem in a Supremacy Clause immunity
case, they do prevent the issues associated with the patchwork approach adopted by
Supremacy Clause immunity’s cousin—qualified immunity.
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You know the greatest danger facing us is ourselves, and irrational
fear of the unknown. There is no such thing as the unknown. Only
things temporarily hidden, temporarily not understood.
—William Shatner as Captain James T. Kirk1
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2020, our country witnessed the tragic deaths of Breonna
Taylor,2 George Floyd,3 and over 160 others.4 As a result, the issue of how we deal
1

Star Trek: The Corbomite Maneuver (NBC television broadcast Nov. 10, 1966).
See generally Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Derrik Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs,
What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/QGC9-T9NP].
3
See generally Luis Andres Henao et al., For George Floyd, A Complicated Life and
A Notorious Death, AP NEWS (June 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/a55d2662f200ead
0da4fed9e923b60a7 [https://perma.cc/UMK4-7MDQ].
4
Police in the U.S. Killed 164 Black People in the First 8 Months of 2020. These Are
Their Names, CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures
/black-people-killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/E8EN-B4NG] (listing
the names of victims of police shootings).
2
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with officer-involved fatalities made national headlines. As calls for investigations
and criminal charges increased and television commentators tried to explain the
barriers to civil lawsuits to the general public, most people became familiar with the
doctrine of qualified immunity.5 Many, however, are unfamiliar with the hidden and
less understood doctrine of Supremacy Clause immunity.6 For those unacquainted,
Supremacy Clause immunity protects federal officers from “allegedly criminal conduct undertaken in [the] discharge of [their] federal duties,”7 if the officer was: (1)
authorized by federal law and (2) “did no more than what was necessary and proper”
in discharging his or her duties.8 With increasing polarization among the states on
how to handle issues such as immigration,9 marijuana legalization,10 gun safety,11
5

See Jay Schweikert, Police Immunity Highlighted by George Floyd Protestors Must
End, and Officers Must Pay, NBC NEWS (June 15, 2020, 2:27 PM), https://www.nbcnews
.com/think/opinion/police-immunity-highlighted-george-floyd-protesters-must-end-officers
-must-ncna1225281 [https://perma.cc/D5RR-WGSF] (explaining qualified immunity in the
wake of George Floyd’s death).
6
See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2197 (2003) (stating
that “there is little case law and virtually no scholarly commentary addressing” Supremacy
Clause immunity). Waxman notes only one Supreme Court case and two scholarly articles.
Id. at n.1–2. Since Waxman & Morrisons’ article was written, we count only two more
articles that touch the subject. See generally Stephen A. Cobb, Note, Jettisoning “Jurisdictional”: Asserting the Substantive Nature of Supremacy Clause Immunity, 103 VA. L. REV.
107 (2017); James Wallace, Supremacy Clause Immunity: Deriving a Willfulness Standard
From Sovereign Immunity, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1499 (2004).
7
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2197; see also Rebecca E. Hatch, Construction
and Application of United States Supreme Court Decisions in Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S.
1, 10 S. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed. 55 (1890), Establishing Standard for Supremacy Clause Immunity
as to Actions of Federal Officers or Agents Alleged to Be in Violation of State Law, 53 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 269, 280–81 (2011) (“[E]stablishing the standard for immunity under the Supremacy
Clause as to actions of federal officers or agents alleged to be in violation of state law (sometimes referred to as ‘Supremacy Clause immunity’).”).
8
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890). This two-pronged test is colloquially
referred to as the Neagle test.
9
See Jake Grovum, Many States Have Their Own Immigration Policies, GOVERNING
(Jul. 22, 2014), https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/many-states-have-their-own-im
migration-policies.html [https://perma.cc/RJ3A-FDUN] (comparing different immigration
policies of various states).
10
See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10482, STATE MARIJUANA “LEGALIZATION” AND FEDERAL DRUG LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW FOR CONGRESS 3 (2020) (detailing the
divide between federal and state marijuana laws); Thomas Fuller, Oregon Decriminalizes
Small Amounts of Heroin and Cocaine; Four States Legalize Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/us/ballot-measures-propositions-2020.html (discussing Oregon’s recent legalization of several schedule one drugs).
11
Guide to the Interstate Transportation of Firearms, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N–INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws [https://perma.cc/4RLC-LP2V] (showcasing
an interactive map explaining the differences in right to carry laws among the United States).
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and voting laws,12 it is only a matter of time before we see an uptick in conflicts
between federal officers and state prosecutors. Unfortunately, courts are ill-equipped
to handle these cases as the current Supremacy Clause immunity test leaves much
to be desired and case law is quite sparse.13 While other scholars have explored the
history of Supremacy Clause immunity and the sources from which the immunity
is derived,14 a more solidified framework is needed to address the intricacies these
cases can present.15 Otherwise, we may find ourselves in the quagmire of ambiguity
that currently plagues qualified immunity.16 The continuing development of this
doctrine will shape the evolving dichotomy between the Supremacy Clause and
other constitutional amendments.
Current case law is divided as to the correct application of the Supremacy
Clause immunity test.17 Moreover, the current test fails to answer questions that
courts are likely to face. For example, federal officers often assert their Supremacy
Clause immunity in pretrial motions to dismiss.18 Where the state does not dispute
material facts, district courts can easily resolve the question of Supremacy Clause
immunity pretrial.19 But when the state does dispute material facts, should district
court judges or juries determine the facts when there is overlap between the criminal
charges and the immunity? And should Supremacy Clause immunity provide federal
officers with the same level of protection as qualified immunity? Or, is a modified
framework more appropriate?
To answer these questions, this Article explores a fictional case that was presented to law students during the 2020 Hunton Andrews Kurth National Moot Court
12

State Voting Laws, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/en
sure-every-american-can-vote/voting-reform/state-voting-laws [https://perma.cc/4CCE-76LZ]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (archiving various state voting laws).
13
See Hatch, supra note 7, at 278–80 (listing a total of only fifty-two cases dealing with
Supremacy Clause immunity).
14
See Cobb, supra note 6; Wallace, supra note 6.
15
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16
See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 60 (2017)
(quoting Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000) (internal quotations omitted)) (“Wading through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most morally
and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges routinely face.”).
17
See id. at 36–37.
18
A recent search on WestLaw reflects sixteen cases where Supremacy Clause immunity
was raised through a motion to dismiss. See WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search
/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default) (search the following: “supremacy clause immunity”/50 “motion to dismiss”) (search last run Feb. 12, 2022).
19
See Texas v. Kleinert, 143 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557 (W.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d 855 F.3d 305
(5th Cir. 2017) (“A motion to dismiss based on Supremacy Clause immunity should be granted
only if the underlying facts supporting the defense are not in dispute.”). Notably, Judge Elrod
who sat on the Fifth Circuit panel that decided Texas v. Kleinert was a judge in the final round
of the competition.
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Championship.20 The problem involved an FBI Agent, Hank Schrader, who was vacationing in the fictional state of New Tejas.21 New Tejas recently legalized the sale
of marijuana.22 Agent Schrader executed a flying tackle during the arrest of a person
who purchased marijuana from a dispensary.23 The state prosecutor then brought criminal charges against Agent Schrader to prevent the federal government from enforcing its drug laws.24 Agent Schrader, of course, asserted Supremacy Clause immunity.25
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, this Article describes the details
of the illustrative case and the different approaches used by district and circuit courts
to answer the questions laid out above.26 Part II delves into our answer on the first
question—who decides disputed issues of material fact on a motion to dismiss when
a federal officer raises a Supremacy Clause immunity defense?27 Further, Part II investigates the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and compares
analogues between habeas corpus, qualified immunity cases, and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56’s standards.28 This analysis ends here with arguments as to why
our solution best balances the competing tensions between the Supremacy Clause and
other constitutional amendments and why federal officers are already well protected
by other legal doctrine and statutes.
In Part III, this Article answers the second question of whether federal officers
who raise Supremacy Clause immunity defenses are entitled to the same level of
protection offered under qualified immunity. Specifically, this Article focuses on
whether Supremacy Clause immunity should provide protection for both mandatory
and discretionary actions. Next, this Article examine when a federal officer is authorized to act and what sources courts can look to in determining whether the
federal officer’s actions were mandatory or discretionary in the first place. Later,
this Part explores whether the officer’s subjective intent is relevant to the immunity.
This Part concludes this discussion by analyzing and recommending an approach
which better defines the meaning of the “necessary and proper” prong of the Neagle
test.29 More precisely, it scrutinizes whether courts should look only to the objective
20

The co-author of this Article, Justin Van Orsdol, and his teammates Adeline Kennerly
Lambert and Spencer Woody, argued this case in the 2020 Hunton Andrews Kurth Moot
Court National Championship. See Hunton Andrews Kurth Moot Court National Championship, UNIV. OF HOUSTON L. CTR., https://www.law.uh.edu/blakely/mcnc/2020/homepage.asp
[https://perma.cc/J4JU-KXTJ].
21
Hunton Andrews Kurth Moot Court National Championship: 2020 Competition Problem,
UNIV. OF HOUSTON L. CTR., 2a, https://www.law.uh.edu/blakely/mcnc/2020/2020%20MC
NC%20Problem.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LU9-K2NT].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 2a–3a.
25
Id.
26
See infra Part I.
27
See infra Part II.
28
See infra Part II.
29
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890).
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reasonableness of the officer’s actions or if courts should continue the analysis by
determining whether the officer violated clearly established law. Finally, this Article
also explores what sources of law should be used to give officers “fair warning.”
I. BREAKING BAD: THE CASE OF SCHRADER V. NEW TEJAS
On November 8, 2016, FBI Agent Hank Schrader was on vacation with his family
in Madrigal, New Tejas.30 Agent Schrader had served the FBI for nearly twenty
years and was stationed in Wisconsin.31 He primarily investigated white collar crimes
like wire fraud, money laundering, and kidnapping, but was never involved in drug
trafficking investigations.32 While driving one morning in Madrigal, Agent Schrader
was involved in a traffic altercation with a local resident, Mr. White.33 Agent Schrader
claimed Mr. White was speeding dangerously, pulled in front of his vehicle, and
slammed on the brakes.34 Agent Schrader was forced to slam on his breaks to avoid
a serious collision that could have endangered his family.35 Shortly after this incident,
at a red light, both men exited their vehicles and angrily exchanged words.36 The
altercation ended with Mr. White shoving Agent Schrader.37 Before Agent Schrader
could respond, the traffic light turned green and both men returned to their vehicles.38
The Schrader family then proceeded to tour a local museum.39
Later that day, Agent Schrader observed Mr. White leaving a marijuana dispensary with a bag of marijuana.40 Consistent with New Tejas law, the dispensary,
Pinkman’s Emporium, was not clearly marked in a visible way.41 New Tejas recently
legalized the sale of marijuana, though it remains illegal under federal law.42 Agent
Schrader denied having any knowledge of the state’s legalization but later testified
that he would have taken the same action regardless.43
30

The facts of this fictional case are taken from the district court record found in the “2020
Moot Court Problem.” See supra note 21. Fans of AMC’s Breaking Bad will notice that the
parties and judges are all named after characters from the show. See Breaking Bad, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0903747/ [https://perma.cc/85SJ-G67J] (listing character names
from the show). While the problem was fictional, its development was predicated on various
real Supremacy Clause immunity cases.
31
See supra note 21, at 27a–28a.
32
See id. at 28a.
33
See id. at 28a–29a.
34
See id. at 29a.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id. at 29a–30a.
39
See id. at 30a.
40
See id. at 30a.
41
See id. at 30a.
42
21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 812, 844 (2012).
43
See supra note 21, at 31a–32a.
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After Agent Schrader observed Mr. White with the marijuana, he shouted at him
to stop and told Mr. White that he was under arrest.44 Agent Schrader then ran toward
Mr. White.45 Alarmed, Mr. White took flight in the opposite direction.46 After a short
chase, Agent Schrader tackled Mr. White from behind onto the concrete sidewalk,
breaking Mr. White’s arm and chipping his teeth.47 It was then that Agent Schrader
identified himself as an FBI agent, handcuffed Mr. White, and told him that he was
under arrest for possession of marijuana.48
The next day the Madrigal County District Attorney, who was elected on a promarijuana platform, spoke at a rally of hundreds of pro-marijuana protestors gathered to complain of what happened to Mr. White.49 The DA stated that the federal
government had no right to interfere with New Tejas state law and vowed to use her
power to prevent federal marijuana laws from being enforced in the state.50 Agent
Schrader, she said, would serve as a warning to others who might try to enforce
federal drug laws.51
Subsequently, the DA indicted Agent Schrader for both assault and aggravated
assault under New Tejas criminal statutes in state court.52 Agent Schrader then removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute.53 Next, he
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
12(b) claiming that he was immune from the prosecution because he had Supremacy
Clause immunity.54
The district court reviewed extensive briefing and held hearings on the immunity
claim.55 The parties disputed three key facts: (1) whether Agent Schrader’s arrest of
Mr. White was necessary to his federal duties, (2) whether Agent Schrader’s subjective intent was to enforce federal law or carry out a personal vendetta from the
prior traffic altercation,56 and (3) whether the force used by Agent Schrader was
objectively unreasonable.57 The district court first determined that it should resolve
material factual disputes when deciding motions to dismiss based on Supremacy
44

See id. at 31a.
See id.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 31a–32a.
48
See id. at 31a.
49
See id. at 32a.
50
See id.
51
See id. at 33a.
52
See id.
53
28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012); see supra note 21, at 33a–34a.
54
See supra note 21, at 34a.
55
See id.
56
See id. at 37a–38a. The district court and majority opinion included a subjective good
faith analysis. Agent Schrader’s mental state overlapped with the New Tejas assault statute’s
“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” causing bodily injury to another. Id. at 45a.
57
See id. at 38a.
45
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Clause immunity claims.58 After doing so, the court found that Agent Schrader was
protected by Supremacy Clause immunity and dismissed the case.59
A split panel of the fictional Thirteenth Circuit reversed.60 First, the Thirteenth
Circuit held that, on a Rule 12 motion, the facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the state (i.e., the nonmoving party) and disregarded the district court’s
findings.61 The court relied on holdings from the Second,62 Sixth,63 and Tenth Circuits.64
Additionally, the court found that because the disputed issues of material fact overlapped with issues a jury would decide, the district court was not in a position to
decide those issues.65 The court’s opinion was also based on a phrase in Rule 12, which
only permits parties to raise pretrial motions that the court “can [] determine[] without [a] trial on the merits.”66 Ultimately, the court decided that this framework best
balanced the tensions between the Supremacy Clause and the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Amendments.67 The Thirteenth Circuit then held that Agent Schrader was not entitled
to Supremacy Clause immunity.68 The court found that Agent Schrader’s arrest was
not necessary to accomplish his federal duties, was not subjectively proper, and was
not objectively proper.69 The majority, however, declined to utilize qualified immunity’s “clearly established” test in its objective reasonableness analysis because,
unlike qualified immunity, which is based on common law doctrine and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Supremacy Clause immunity is based in the Constitution.70
The dissenting opinion, of course, held the opposite.71 In his dissent, Judge
Hamlin, citing the Ninth Circuit’s approach, opined that district court judges should
decide disputed issues of material fact on Rule 12 motions under Supremacy Clause
immunity because Supremacy Clause immunity is not just a mere defense but
immunity from suit altogether.72 Moreover, the dissent claimed that it would be too
58

See id. at 37a.
See id. at 41a.
60
See id. at 13a.
61
See id. at 8a.
62
See id. at 6a; New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing
this matter, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and assume the truth
of the allegations in the indictment.”).
63
See supra note 21, at 6a; Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 751 (6th Cir. 1988).
64
See supra note 21, at 6a; Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006).
65
See supra note 21, at 8a.
66
See id. at 7a.
67
See id. at 7a–8a.
68
See id. at 8a–9a.
69
See id. at 9a–13a.
70
See id. at 12a.
71
See id. at 15a–26a.
72
See id. at 16a–17a; see also Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, federal protective immunity will shield a federal agent
from state prosecution.”).
59
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easy for the state to fabricate a factual dispute.73 Judge Hamlin also relied on Idaho
v. Horiuchi, in which the Ninth Circuit cited myriad examples of other immunity
defenses that district court judges decide without involving juries including double
jeopardy, immunity deals, privilege, and other evidentiary matters.74 Lastly, the dissent
argued that judges are better positioned to restrain overzealous state prosecutors.75
As one would expect, Judge Hamlin found that Agent Schrader was entitled to Supremacy Clause immunity.76 He found that Agent Schrader’s actions were necessary
to accomplish his federal duties, because federal officers’ duties include both mandatory and discretionary acts.77 Next, Judge Hamlin held that Supremacy Clause
immunity should not include subjective intent,78 in line with established Fourth
Amendment79 and qualified immunity precedent.80 Finally, the dissent stated that
Agent Schrader’s actions were objectively proper because Supremacy Clause
immunity should provide as much protection as qualified immunity.81 According to
the dissent, Agent Schrader did not violate clearly established law.82
The concurring opinion offered yet another approach based off dicta from a
Tenth Circuit opinion in Wyoming v. Livingston.83 In her concurrence, Judge Skyler
suggested that Supremacy Clause immunity may require balancing between the federal
need and the gravity of the offense.84 She found that Mr. White had—at most—
committed a minor regulatory offense, given the recent change in public opinion on
the criminalization of marijuana.85 Judge Skyler, however, concluded that Agent
Schrader had committed a grievous offense for the purpose of enforcing a trivial
federal policy.86
73

See supra note 21, at 17a.
See id. at 17a–18a; see also Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 375 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(discussing resolution of factual disputes under immunities), vacated as moot, 266 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 2001).
75
See supra note 21, at 18a.
76
See id. at 20a.
77
See id. at 20a–21a.
78
See id. at 21a–24a.
79
See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813–14 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
80
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
816–17 (1982).
81
See supra note 21, at 24a.
82
See id. at 24a–26a.
83
443 F.3d 1211, 1222 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We also leave for another day whether
federal officers are entitled to Supremacy Clause immunity where their state law violation
was disproportionate to the federal policy they were carrying out—where, for example, they
commit a grievous state offense for the purpose of enforcing a trivial federal policy.”); see
supra note 21, at 14a.
84
See supra note 21, at 14a.
85
See id. at 14a.
86
While beyond the scope of this Article, we believe this third approach is improper
74
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The case was appealed to Supreme Court.87 There, the following questions were
certified: (1) when deciding a motion to dismiss a state criminal prosecution based
on immunity under the Supremacy Clause, are disputed issues of fact decided by the
district court; and (2) what test governs whether the Supremacy Clause provided a
federal officer with immunity from state criminal prosecution?88 It is these questions, and others implicitly raised, that this Article seeks to answer.89
II. DEMYSTIFYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD IN
SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY CASES
With a broad sketch of Supremacy Clause immunity on our canvas, we can now
paint in the details. Before one can examine the appropriate test for Supremacy
Clause immunity, one must decide whether a district court judge or a jury should
decide disputed issues of material fact when a defendant raises Supremacy Clause
immunity on a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) motion to dismiss. This
question is a fundamental starting point because the power of most immunity defenses, like qualified immunity, is that they function as a dual-layered shield.90 The
first layer protects the defendant from suit altogether while the second acts as a
back-up, offering protection from liability should the first layer fail.
While disputed issues of material fact are a relatively rare phenomena when it
comes to Supremacy Clause immunity cases, the question is an important one.91 The
fact that the issue has been raised in past Supremacy Clause immunity cases, and has
resulted in different approaches, makes it necessary to discuss.92 Generally, in a
Supremacy Clause immunity case, a Rule 12 motion is handled in three steps. First,
because states cannot interfere with federal law regardless of the state law’s importance. See id.;
see also Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986) (“There can be no dispute that the
Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of Congress.”).
87
See supra note 21, at 1.
88
See id.
89
See id. The fictional Supreme Court was comprised of actual former justices of Supreme Court of Texas, and judges from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The panel did not offer
a written opinion, but did hold in favor of Agent Schrader.
90
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (describing qualified immunity as
an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”); Michael L. Wells, Scott v.
Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 29 REV. LITIG. 65, 95 (2009)
(“Police officers are ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity, which means that they are
shielded from suits for damages . . . .”).
91
We know of only two cases that have squarely dealt with this issue. See Idaho v. Horiuchi,
253 F.3d 359, 374–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The only case to speak directly to this issue comes from
the early part of the last century.” (citing West Virginia v. Laing, 133 F. 887, 891 (4th Cir.
1904))). We discuss why this is rare throughout Part II.
92
See id. at 374–76 (discussing the difficulty in deciding whether a judge or a jury should
decide disputed issues of material fact for a motion to dismiss based on Supremacy Clause
immunity).
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the court examines the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state and the
court assumes the truth of the allegations in the indictment.”93 Second, the federal
officer makes a “threshold showing” of Supremacy Clause immunity.94 Last, the
state then “bears the burden of coming forward with an evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a material issue of fact concerning the validity of Supremacy Clause
immunity.”95 If there is no dispute of a genuine issue of material fact or the state fails
to meet its burden, all courts agree that the district court should grant the motion to
dismiss.96 The problem arises when there are genuine factual issues in dispute. Most
courts have been able to evade this question, but the Ninth Circuit addressed it in
Idaho v. Horiuchi.97 In Horuichi, the Ninth Circuit decided that judges, rather than
juries, should decide disputed issues of material fact.98 Though the decision was later
vacated on other grounds, its reasoning provides insight as to how courts might deal
with disputed facts in Supremacy Clause immunity cases.
The Horiuchi court reasoned that judges were the proper arbiters of disputed
issues of fact because Supremacy Clause immunity should function as immunity
from suit altogether, just like other immunity defenses.99 Additionally, the court was
concerned with potential jury confusion between state and federal law.100 Last, the
court believed that judges should serve as a “substantial safeguard against frivolous
or vindictive criminal charges by states against federal offices.”101
With Supremacy Clause immunity, however, this dual-layered shield is unnecessary for several reasons. First, the plain language of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)’s “without a trial on the merits”102 language prohibits judges from
ruling in the face of material factual disputes. Second, the other types of immunities
93

Texas v. Kleinert, 143 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557 (W.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d 855 F.3d 305 (5th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 642 (2018) (citing New York v. Tanella, 374 F.2d 141,
148 (2d Cir. 2004)).
94
See id.; California v. Dotson, No. 12-CR-0917-AJB, 2012 WL 1904467, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. May 25, 2012) (citing Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 751 (6th Cir. 1988)) (“When
a federal officer seeks to use Supremacy Clause immunity he must first establish a threshold
defense of immunity.”). It is unclear what evidence standard is used in this showing, but the
courts appear to treat it like a preliminary question. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (2011).
95
Kleinert, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 557; Long, 837 F.2d at 751.
96
City of Jackson v. Jackson, 235 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (“The district
court should grant the motion in the absence of an affirmative showing by the state that the
facts supporting the immunity claim are in dispute.”).
97
253 F.3d 359, 367, 378 (9th Cir. 2001). Waxman gives a more in-depth analysis of
Horiuchi. See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2203–06.
98
Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 378.
99
Id. at 375 (analogizing supremacy clause immunity to immunity deals, double jeopardy,
and privilege).
100
Id. (“[A]sking the jury to apply two similar—yet distinct—legal standards to the same
set of facts can only lead to confusion.”).
101
Id. at 376 (noting that officers cannot be immunized from criminal liability in the same
way that they can from damages in the qualified immunity context).
102
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1).
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cited by the Ninth Circuit are not proper analogies to Supremacy Clause immunity.103 Third, the Ninth Circuit’s lack of faith in juries to decide disputed issues of
material fact is undermined when comparing treatment under other similar federal
rules and contexts. Fourth, allowing juries, rather than judges, to decide these issues
best eases tension with other constitutional amendments. Finally, federal officers are
already adequately protected from overzealous state prosecutors by the federal
officer removal statute, state law, and the burden shifting framework inherent in the
motion to dismiss standard.
A. The Meaning of Rule 12
Under Rule 12, “[a] party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or
request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.”104 Proponents of
the dual shield theory argue that Supremacy Clause immunity is a distinct jurisdictional question to be determined before a state can pursue the case on the merits.105
Further, these proponents contend that extra protection is required because, unlike
civil cases, criminal liability calls for a more cautious approach.106 In the civil context,
government agencies may, and regularly do, indemnify officers against suits.107 This
theoretically forces law enforcement agencies to internalize social costs imposed by
their officers. Put differently, civil damages are about both enterprise and personal
accountability.108 In Supremacy Clause immunity cases, however, the government
agency cannot fully indemnify the agent because “criminal liability threatens the
officer personally in a way that civil liability does not.”109
This application of Rule 12, in our view, is incorrect for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has already opined that conflicts of evidence transform immunities
into a “matter of defense” rather than a bar to suit altogether.110 And second, the plain
language of Rule 12 demands a different result.
103

Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 375.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1) (emphasis added).
105
See Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that when Supremacy
Clause immunity is established “the prosecution has no factual basis upon which to prosecute
[the federal officer] and the entire proceeding is a nullity”); Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 375 (“[T]he
question of Supremacy clause immunity, while very similar to the issues presented in the
criminal case, is nevertheless quite distinct.”).
106
See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that, in civil
cases, disputed issues of material fact “prevent[] a determination of . . . immunity at summary
judgment, the case must proceed to trial”).
107
John. C. Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47, 50 n.16 (1998).
108
Alexander Volokh, The Modest Effect of Minneci v. Polard on Inmate Litigants, 46
AKRON L. REV. 287, 294–95 (2013) (stating that § 1983 “lawsuits are against the government
in all but name”).
109
Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 376.
110
United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 8 (1906).
104
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1. Immunity From Suit or a Matter of Defense?
Prior to enacting the Federal Officer Removal Statute,111 Supremacy Clause immunity cases were brought by a writ of habeas corpus.112 An early example is United
States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis.113 Ralph W. Drury was a second lieutenant in the U.S.
Army who commanded twenty soldiers.114 Lt. Drury and his men were stationed at
Allegheny Arsenal in Pittsburgh.115 Some of the buildings at the arsenal had copper
downspouts, which were targeted by thieves in the area.116 To thwart any further thefts,
Lt. Drury ordered his men to patrol the arsenal.117 That decision would ultimately
land him in jail.118 One night, Lt. Drury received reports of thieves stealing copper
and ordered a few of his men to apprehend them.119 A chase ensued and one of Lt.
Drury’s soldiers shot the suspect in his thigh, resulting in the man’s death.120 Lt. Drury
and the solider were indicted by the state for murder and manslaughter.121 The circuit
court denied Lt. Drury’s writ because it found that there were disputed facts as to
whether the suspect had surrendered before he was shot.122 The court concluded that
it was “not competent for the court to determine upon conflicting evidence whether
the person under indictment in the state court is guilty or innocent of the offense of
which he is accused.”123 That jurisdiction belonged to the state court. When the case
finally reached the Supreme Court it was faced with the question: “[S]hould this
court interfere to prevent the trial of the petitioners upon indictment in the state
court[?]”124 In affirming the circuit court, Chief Justice Fuller, found that there were
disputed issues of material fact and those disputed issues transformed Lt. Drury’s
111

28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012).
Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “early Supremacy Clause immunity cases were based on habeas corpus statutes that provided for a grant
of the writ”). As the Tenth Circuit points out in Livingston, there is one earlier case where
the Supreme Court on direct appeal determined that a post office employee was immune
from a state criminal conviction for driving in Maryland without a state license. See Johnson
v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920).
113
See generally Drury, 200 U.S. 1.
114
Id. at 2.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 4.
119
Id. at 2–3.
120
Id. at 3.
121
Id. at 2.
122
See United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 129 F. 823, 825 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1904) (noting
the soldier testified he warned the suspect to stop but other witnesses testified that the suspect
had surrendered), aff’d 200 U.S. 1 (1906).
123
Id. at 827.
124
Drury, 200 U.S. at 4.
112
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immunity into a “matter of defense,” meaning his status as a federal officer did not
provide him with immunity from suit.125
A few decades later, the Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion.126 In
Birsch v. Tumbleson,127 a federal game warden attempted to arrest three hunters who
allegedly shot wild ducks out of season in violation the federal Migratory Bird Act
Treaty.128 Like the attempted arrest in Drury, the arrest here did not go according to
plan and the warden killed two of the three hunters.129 And the court again was faced
with a “he-said, he-said” situation. The warden testified that the hunters shot at him
after being told they were under arrest.130 The surviving hunter testified that they
received no warning and that it was the warden and his officers who immediately
opened fire.131 The Fourth Circuit found itself answering a similar question: Should
the warden be immune from suit because of his status as a federal officer executing
federal duties?132 Relying on Drury, the Fourth Circuit found that the warden was
not immune because there was conflicting evidence.133
Viewing Supremacy Clause immunity as a jurisdictional issue (i.e., immunity from
suit) rather than a substantive defense presents other problems. First, if the immunity
is treated as a jurisdictional issue, it would give courts the power to raise the issue sua
sponte, which could prevent states from enforcing state criminal law against federal
officers altogether.134 Second, viewing the immunity as jurisdictional prevents courts
from invoking principles of equity and fairness.135 This would all but exclude the
approach of the concurrence from the moot court problem, that is balancing the
severity of the violation of the state law against the need of the federal policy that
was being carried out. Such an approach forecloses courts from considering the
state’s interest based on preemption grounds, which invariably “takes into account
the state interest embodied in the challenged law.”136 And last, for those concerned
125

Id. at 8.
Birsch v. Tumbleson, 31 F.2d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1929).
127
Id. at 811.
128
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (1936)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 811–12.
131
Id. at 812.
132
See id. at 814 (“The present case involves the question of the right to discharge on habeas
corpus proceedings in advance of trial on the merits federal officials who claim protection
of the laws of the United States from prosecution . . . because of their official status in connection with the alleged offense with which they are charged, seek to be discharged from custody
and not subjected to a trial on the merits.”).
133
Id. at 813 (deciding that where “material facts are established . . . are involved in uncertainty and the subject of conflicting testimony . . . naturally invokes the verdict of the jury”).
134
See Cobb, supra note 6, at 141–42.
135
See id. at 145.
136
See id.; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)
(noting that “where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility” preemption may not apply).
126
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with the fate of federal officers in Supremacy Clause immunity cases consider this:
viewing the immunity as jurisdictional rather than substantive could eliminate the
invocation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. As Stephen Cobb explains,137 if courts declines to hear, or dismiss, the case based on the idea that Supremacy Clause immunity
is jurisdictional, that is not a final decision protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.138
A final decision is “any ‘ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for the offense.’139 This includes substantive defenses.”140 Thus,
viewing Supremacy Clause immunity as jurisdictional—rather than substantive—
reduces the protections afforded to federal officers. For those who view Supremacy
Clause immunity as “immunity from suit altogether,” this creates quite the conundrum and could subject federal officers to multiple suits.141
2. The Plain Language of Rule 12
Assuming that Supremacy Clause immunity is a defense—rather than immunity
from suit altogether—this section will turn to how this factors into Rule 12 itself.
Those in the Horiuchi camp might argue that Rule 12 encourages district courts to
resolve immunity defense on a pretrial motion to dismiss. In fact, the Advisory
Committee Notes explains that Rule 12(b)(1)’s “group of objections and defenses”
includes determining whether the federal officer has immunity from criminal
prosecution.142 Moreover, Rule 12 “creates a presumption that motions filed prior
to trial will be resolved prior to trial.”143 Rule 12(d) requires courts to “decide every
pretrial motion before trial unless it finds good cause to defer a ruling.”144
137

Cobb is a former law clerk to Judge Pamela Reeves of the Eastern District of Tennessee
and is now a trial attorney at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See Stephen
Cobb, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/sacobbva/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
138
Cobb, supra note 6, at 149 (citing United States v. Gustavason, 454 F.2d 677, 678 (7th
Cir. 1971) (en banc)). Cobb goes on to explain that “where a court dismisses on the basis of
a defense that goes to the merits—a substantive defense—the defendant is protected from
future prosecution by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” See also Cobb, supra note 6, at 150.
139
Cobb, supra note 6, at 149.
140
Cobb, supra note 6, at 150 (emphasis added).
141
We do not necessarily agree with Cobb’s reasoning here. Arguably, if a defendant is
immune, he is immune and the Double Jeopardy Clause would not come into play. We mention
his argument because it is possible that courts could agree, and if so, Cobb’s reasoning
bolsters our argument that the correct view of Supremacy Clause immunity is substantive—
not jurisdictional.
142
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1) Advisory Comm.’s Notes to 1944 Amend. (stating that
Rule 12(b)(2) includes all “defenses and objections . . . includ[ing] such matters as . . .
immunity . . .”).
143
1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure
Criminal § 195 (5th ed. 2020).
144
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(d). Rule 12(d) also requires courts to “state its essential findings
on the record” when there are “factual issues . . . involved in deciding [the] motion.” Id.
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This analysis, while appropriate for other collateral immunities such as double
jeopardy and immunity deals, fails to capture the nuances at play when Supremacy
Clause immunity cases intersect with Rule 12.145 A further reading of the Advisory
Committee Notes supports our view that Supremacy Clause immunity operates as
a substantive defense—not a procedural bar.146 To start, the 1944 amendment labels
Rule 12(b) as “defenses and objections,” which would mean that Supremacy Clause
immunity is a type of defense.147 And, in the 2014 amendment, the Advisory Committee
emphasizes that pretrial motions to dismiss are subject to important limitations.148
The critical limitation for Supremacy Clause immunity cases is that “the motion
must be one that the court can determine ‘without a trial on the merits.’”149 Therein
lies the problem. Supremacy Clause immunity claims are not collateral, instead they
can overlap with the state criminal charge especially on the issue of reasonableness
and self-defense. For example, suppose in our hypothetical case Agent Schrader testified that Mr. White was charging at him, but Mr. White testified that he had surrendered. Agent Schrader’s use of a flying tackle might be objectively reasonable under
his version of the facts but not under Mr. White’s. That reasonability decision would
be determinative in both the state criminal assault charge and in Agent Schrader’s
Supremacy Clause immunity defense. Moreover, allowing a judge to resolve these
factual disputes could result in cognitive dissonance problems, which are part of the
reason that people are uncomfortable in qualified immunity decisions where judges
hold that a defendant’s actions violate the constitution but do not violate clearly
established law.150 For instance, assume a judge resolves a factual dispute finding
the officer’s actions unreasonable and at the pretrial stage allows the criminal trial
to proceed. The jury could still conclude the officer’s actions were reasonable under
state law, or the jury could feel psychologically pressured to convict based on the
judge’s prior finding that the officer’s actions were not reasonable for Supremacy
Clause immunity purposes. While lawyers and judges might understand the nuances
of this, cognitive dissonance would not be an issue if juries dealt with factual disputes.
To complicate matters further there is the issue of credibility: whose version of the
145

Even the Ninth Circuit recognized these analogies were imperfect. See Idaho v. Horiuchi,
253 F.3d 359, 375 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We recognize that none of these provides a perfect analogy
because a claim of Supremacy Clause immunity is much more central to the subject matter
of the criminal case than, for example, a claim of double jeopardy.”).
146
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1) Advisory Committee’s Notes to 1944 Amendment (“These
two paragraphs classify into two groups all objections and defenses to be interposed by motion
prescribed by Rule 12(a).”) (emphasis added).
147
Id.
148
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 Advisory Comm. Notes to the 2014 Amend.
149
Id. (emphasis added) (noting that “without a trial on the merits” has been substituted
for the more archaic phrase “trial of the general issue” but that no change in meaning is
intended).
150
This cognitive dissonance problem is discussed more thoroughly below. See infra note
355.
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facts to believe. And the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that credibility
determinations are a jury issue.151 At bottom, because an overlap often exists between
the state law at issue and Supremacy Clause immunity,152 the plain language of Rule
12 mitigates against judges deciding the immunity issue when there are disputed
issues of material fact.153
B. Lack of Jury Confusion Under Equivalent Federal Rules and Other Analogs
In recognizing the faulty analogies of double jeopardy and immunity deals, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the adage that judges are superior arbiters when overlaps
exist because “asking the jury to apply two similar—yet distinct—legal standards
to the same set of facts can only lead to confusion.”154 According to the Ninth Circuit,
only judges “versed in the subtleties of federal immunity law” are equipped to handle
these nuances.155 Besides, if the judge is incorrect, the state could always appeal the
decision, which is easier than appealing a jury verdict.156
While judges have superior legal training and expertise, the Ninth Circuit’s view
underestimates the ability of juries to handle complex matters.157 The Ninth Circuit’s
view also contradicts their approach to the same issue in the civil context.158 After
all, it was the Ninth Circuit that said: “Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with
deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their task,
which is rarely equaled in other areas of public service.”159 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has yet to give an affirmative answer in the civil context.160 Juries are wellqualified to handle the complexity of Supremacy Clause immunity cases because they
have done so in equally complex matters involving mixed questions of law and fact.161
151

See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (“A fundamental premise of
our criminal trial system that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’” (citation omitted)).
152
See Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 362, 364–65, 375 (9th Cir. 2001).
153
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, Advisory Comm. Notes to the 2014 Amend.
154
Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 375.
155
Id. at 376.
156
Id.
157
There are certainly arguments against allowing juries even in complex civil cases. See
generally Hugh H. Bownes, Should Trial by Jury Be Eliminated in Complex Cases?, 1 RISK
75 (1990) (outlining arguments against juries in complex cases); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088–89 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing cases where striking jury
trial demands may be appropriate).
158
See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 430 (9th Cir. 1979).
159
Id.
160
Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1496–97 (1997).
161
See Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment,
80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 68 (1981) (discussing whether the seventh amendment protects the
right to trial by jury in complex civil cases); see also Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley, Trial by
Jury: Why it Works and Why it Matters, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2019) (“I am an
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Juries, for example, are generally empowered to decide mixed questions of law
and fact in qualified immunity cases,162 or at least have been given avenues to decide
factual issues.163 In Lore v. City of Syracuse,164 for instance, the Second Circuit was
faced with the issue of how to handle unresolved factual issues surrounding a police
officer’s § 1983 complaint stemming from alleged employment discrimination.165
The case was quite complex and involved multiple issues and parties, state and federal
law, and a cross appeal.166 The Second Circuit, however, held that “[i]f there are
unresolved factual issues which prevent an early disposition of the defense, the jury
should decide these issues on special interrogatories.”167 The Ninth Circuit has handled
these complex mixed questions by way of jury instructions.168 In Sloman v. Tadlock,169
the district court combated the complexity issue by giving detailed jury instructions,
which the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld.170 While the district court was able to
handle many of the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment, two of the claims were
submitted to the jury because there was conflicting evidence.171 With proper instructions, jurors will understand and be able to determine why an action might be unreasonable for the Supremacy Clause immunity determination but reasonable under
the state law standard. Allowing juries to deliberate on the issues would alleviate
some of the cognitive dissonance problems that might otherwise accrue.
unabashed believer in the jury system . . . juries can sort out even complex issues when given
the proper tools . . . .”).
162
Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 367 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Whether a defendant officer’s
conduct was objectively reasonable is a mixed question of law and fact.”). The same is true
in the criminal context. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (determining
that “materiality” in criminal fraud was a mixed question of law and fact that has “typically
been resolved by juries”).
163
See, e.g., Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s summary judgement decision denying the defendant qualified immunity
as a matter of law because there were disputed issues of material fact); Snyder v. Trepangnier,
142 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding the district court’s ruling to submit “important
factual questions” on the “issue of qualified immunity to the jury”).
164
670 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2012).
165
Id. at 142.
166
Id. at 141–43.
167
Id. at 162 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Warren v. Dwyer,
906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990)).
168
See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1470–71 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the review
of jury instructions in a qualified immunity case).
169
Id.; see also Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 1984) (“facts are ‘involved in uncertainty and the subject of conflicting testimony’ they should be resolved by the
verdict of a state court.” (citation omitted)).
170
Tadlock, 21 F.3d at 1472 (“Considering the [jury] instructions as a whole, we find no
abuse of discretion.”).
171
Id. at 1466 (noting that plaintiff’s claims for conspiracy against the police officers and
his claim against the city were sent to the jury).
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Another potential guidepost in answering the “judge versus jury” question are
motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.172 Like
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, motions for summary judgment have the
same practical effect of resolving a case entirely.173 Under Rule 56, if “there are no
genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law,” the judge can decide the immunity question.174 This is similar to how the
Western District of Texas in Kleinert explained Rule 12 motions under Supremacy
Clause immunity.175 And under Rule 56 motions the courts have been clear that,
“[t]he issue of whether a [defendant] is entitled to . . . immunity cannot be resolved
as a matter of law [when there is a] factual conflict surrounding the circumstances.”176 Because “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”177 Further, the Supreme Court has said
that Rule 56 “is not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an application
of [a] more general rule.”178 The Supreme Court has compared civil and criminal
rules before, and, given the similarities, could and should do so here.179 Adopting a
“Rule-56-like approach” could serve as the template for allowing juries to resolve
disputed issues of material fact in Supremacy Clause immunity cases.
C. Easing Tension With Other Constitutional Amendments
Allowing juries to decide disputed issues of material fact on Rule 12 motions
to dismiss for Supremacy Clause immunity claims also eases tension with other
constitutional amendments. In particular, this framework relieves conflicts with the
Fifth, Sixth, and the Tenth Amendments.
172

See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986) (stating that
the question for summary judgment is whether the evidence is so contradictory that a jury
is needed); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 650 (2014) (holding that the court failed to consider
contradicting evidence under Rule 56(a)).
173
See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 246 (referencing the district court using summary
judgement to enter judgement in favor of the petitioners).
174
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
175
See Klienert, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
176
Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991).
177
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
178
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014).
179
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252–53 (comparing motions for summary judgement with motions
for acquittal in criminal cases). Justice Rehnquist, however, has voiced opposition to such
comparisons. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no exact analog in the
criminal process to the motion for summary judgment in a civil case. Perhaps the closest
comparable device for screening out unmeritorious cases in the criminal area is the grand
jury proceeding, though the comparison is obviously not on all fours.”).
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1. Fifth Amendment Tensions
“Chipping away at the right to trial by jury in any context seems ill-advised,”180
and that is particularly true when it comes to clashes between federal and state
powers. It is vital to uphold the balance between these warring factions of power and
it is at least equally important to preserve our constitutional amendments, such as
due process. Although federal officers enjoy a substantive right to immunity,181 the
Constitution says nothing about procedure: how such a right must be enforced, by
whom, or when. Such issues of adjudication are often governed by rules and statutes
not found in the Constitution.182 It follows then, that courts should form a solution
to the Rule 12 problem that best balances these competing interests—without violating
existing constitutional rights—including due process.
The Fifth Amendment states “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime . . . without due process of law . . . .”183 And the
Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause “require[s] criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element
of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”184 Allowing
judges, rather than juries, to determine disputed issues of material fact curtails the
role of the jury and erodes the Due Process Clause. Moreover, it is the “jury’s
constitutional responsibility . . . not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the
law to those facts and draw ultimate conclusions of guilt or innocence.”185 Not only
would a judge be depriving the jury of its responsibility to determine facts, they
would also be preventing them from applying those facts to the law and drawing a
conclusion of guilt or innocence.
2. Sixth Amendment Tensions
Letting juries decide disputed issues of material fact on Rule 12 motions to
dismiss raised under Supremacy Clause immunity also prevents conflicts with the
Sixth Amendment. To begin, let us address the elephant in the room because the oddity
180

O’Malley, supra note 161, at 1109.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (holding that federal officers are
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of public policy).
182
For example, the federal officer removal statute describes the removal process when
a civil or criminal action is commenced against a federal officer. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1969).
183
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 343 (1769) (“[T]he truth
of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal,
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s]
equals and neighbors . . . .”).
185
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514.
181
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of this argument is not lost on us. Most people think of the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury in terms of a right held solely by defendants,186 however, that is not the
complete story. In operation, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right functions in tandem with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.187 Thus, the right to a jury trial
is held not only by defendants, but also by the court, and the state—via its prosecutors.
The Constitution provides that: “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes have been committed.”188
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state.”189 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 has codified the interest in jury trials for judges and
prosecutors, along with criminal defendants.190 Rule 23 requires a jury trial unless:
“(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; (2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.”191 Therefore, the ability to waive a jury trial is a tripartite
decision—even if it is usually initiated by defendants.192 In fact, the prosecutor’s right
is equally as powerful to that of the accused.193
Those who would support judges making the decision on factual disputes in
Supremacy Clause immunity cases might argue that the Supreme Court left open a
door for defendants, in our case federal officers, to waive a jury trial despite Rule 23.
186

See U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., SIXTH AMENDMENT—RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS 1612 (2014), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014
/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014-10-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6DG-5BA8] (“A right to jury trial
is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.” (emphasis
added)); Jessica A. Roth, The Constitution Is On Pause in America’s Courtrooms, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/constitution-pause
-americas-courtrooms/616633/ [https://perma.cc/Z6KS-ZL22] (discussing the effect of COVID19 on “the constitutional rights of . . . defendants” to “exercise their right to jury trial”).
187
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of the People in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 274 (2019) (noting judges often perform a balancing test—based on the rules of
Criminal Procedure—when considering a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
188
U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2.
189
Id. amend. VI.
190
See Richard L. Peterson, Unintelligent Jury Waivers: A Call to Amend Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 23(A), 21 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 441, 449–51 (2011) (discussing the
incentives defendants face in waiving trial by jury); Zachary Buda, Note, A Critique of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(B)(2)(B) and a Proposal to Level the Playing Field for De
fendants, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1566 (2021) (explaining the considerable power enjoyed
by the government under Rule 23(B)(2)(B)). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
191
FED. R. CRIM P. 23(a)(1)–(3) (emphasis added).
192
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965) (upholding the rights of prosecutors
to demand jury trials under Criminal Procedure Rule 23).
193
Fred Anthony DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment
of the “Prosecutorial Veto,” 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1983) (describing the withholding of a prosecutor’s consent under Rule 23 as “essentially . . . a veto power”).
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In Singer v. United States, the Court noted that “a defendant’s reasons for wanting
to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on
trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.”194 This
dicta has been interpreted to mean that “a court [may] [] override a prosecutor’s
withholding of consent . . . if forcing a jury trial upon the defendant would result in
a denial of his right to a fair trial.”195 Overcoming the Government’s objection to
jury trials has been exceedingly rare and granted only in extreme cases such as conflicts with the defendant’s religious beliefs,196 or more recently due to complications
with COVID-19.197 If other cases involving prejudice from suspected compromised
jurors or prejudice from a defendant’s past crimes do not rise to the requisite level
to overcome the Government’s objection to a jury trial, then neither should cases
involving Supremacy Clause immunity. Instead, the opposite is true, as federal officers
enjoy other protections—such as the federal officer removal statute—which guard
against perceived unfairness in state court jury trials.198
Further, other arguments in favor of judge-made determinations, like those made
in § 1983 cases, do not apply when dealing with criminal cases. For example, some
scholars suggest that judges are better suited to make determinations of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, first, because jurors tend to award
damages based on whether they think the defendant has money, and second, because
juries tend to favor some plaintiffs over others, especially when the defendant is a police
officer and where jurors have had unpleasant experiences with police.199 Unlike § 1983
cases, Supremacy Clause immunity cases do not involve making a plaintiff whole, so
damages become a non-issue.200 And unlike state police, it is less likely those in jury
pool have had experience with federal officers.201 Additionally, nearly all Supremacy
194

Singer, 380 U.S. at 37.
DeCicco, supra note 193, at 1093–94 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ceja,
451 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 1971) (explaining how impartial jurors might satisfy a defendant’s
burden in overriding a prosecutor’s insistence on a jury trial); United States v. Harris, 314
F. Supp. 437, 438–39 (D. Minn. 1970) (stating that hypothetical prejudice of a defendant’s
past crimes does meet defendant’s burden).
196
United States v. Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 567–77 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (ordering a bench
trial over the government’s objection where jury trial violated defendant’s religious beliefs).
197
United States v. Cohn, No. 19-CR-097, 2020 WL 5050945, at *10–11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2020) (finding that conditions arising from COVID-19, combined with defendant’s health
profile, could effectively rob defendant of testifying on his own behalf which—along with
other factors—warranted defendant’s waiver of a jury trial over the Government’s objection).
198
See infra Section II.D.
199
See Wells, supra note 90, at 90 (describing arguments in favor of judges in Fourth
Amendment cases).
200
See generally Wallace, supra note 6 (clarifying recovery sought in Supremacy Clause
immunity cases is usually injunctive, declaratory, or habeas corpus relief).
201
The Department of Justice reports that there are around 132,000 federal officers
authorized to make arrests, while there are reportedly 701,169 state police authorized to make
195
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Clause cases would be removed to federal court, so it is unclear how sentencing would
be carried out.202 That said, assuming a federal court carried out sentencing similar
to the way it carries out state law crimes on federal lands under the Assimilative Crimes
Act,203 the judge—not the jury—would impose the sentence and, furthermore, the
sentence would be guided by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and state law mandatory maximums and minimums.204 Thus, the fear of excessive penalties based on
hypothetical bad blood toward the officer based on past experience is negated.
Last, allowing judges rather than juries to decide disputed issues of material fact
premised solely on the defendant being a federal officer deprives the public205—here
state citizens—of its right to “perform its accustomed role as the arbiter of factual disputes.”206 The public’s interest in performing this role in Supremacy Clause immunity
claims is extraordinary, at least if you subscribe to President Theodore Roosevelt’s
belief that “no man is above the law.”207 Surely a federal officer breaking state law
would garner public interest in enforcing the state law against that officer.208 Further,
arrests. See CONNOR BROOKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. STATS., FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2016—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/con
tent/pub/pdf/fleo16st.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VV9-764Z]; SHELLEY HYLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
1997–2016, at 1 (2018).
202
Based on our research, no federal officer has been found guilty and sentenced after
removing the case to federal court, at least in the relatively few modern cases.
203
18 U.S.C. § 13. It is also possible that states could bring charges under a converse § 1983
action, however, Congress could easily preempt these types of laws. See Waxman & Morrison,
supra note 6, at 2247.
204
See United States v. Montigue, 357 F. Supp. 2d 939, 941 (E.D. Va. 2005) (discussing
that federal courts imposing penalties under the Assimilative Crimes Act must fall within the
state statutory limits but that punishment must be similar, not identical) (citing United States
v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 991–92
(9th Cir. 1978)).
205
See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501 (1976) (interpreting the Speedy Trial
Act to be “designed with the public interest firmly in mind”).
206
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 585
F.2d 1087, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Note that the Court stated this holding in the context of
affirmative defenses which, if we are correct about Supremacy Clause immunity, would apply
there as well.
207
President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1903)
(transcript available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/decem
ber-7-1903-third-annual-message [https://perma.cc/CF4X-UCZL]).
208
The public interest has been used as a factor in considering whether to overrule the
Government’s objections to a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., United States v. Cohn,
No. 19-CR-097, 2020 WL 5050945, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2020) (citations omitted) (listing
the four factors as: (1) whether the government’s purpose is proper; (2) whether a jury trial
“interferes with the defendant’s exercise of a separate constitutional right”; (3) whether a jury
trial “implicates the public’s right to a speedy trial”; and (4) whether “case-specific factors . . .
would render obtaining an impartial jury trial difficult or unworkable”).
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the default position in criminal cases is trial by jury.209 After all, the Supreme Court
found that “the maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body in criminal cases is
of such importance and has such a place in our traditions” that the three-party consent
requirements under Rule 23 must be met before it can be waived.210
3. Tenth Amendment Tensions
Lastly, there is the obvious tension with the Tenth Amendment. If judges are
allowed to decide disputed issues of material fact, the likelihood that the state will
be able to enforce its laws against federal officers would decline if the high grants
of immunity in § 1983 and Bivens cases are any indication.211 Additionally, as described above, the jury is comprised of citizens of the state. And giving judges the sole
power to resolve disputed issues of material fact deprives state citizens of an active
role in enforcing state criminal law.
The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
States respectively or to the people.”212 And the Supreme Court has recognized both
dual sovereignty and the power of States to enforce criminal laws.213 The Court has
209

Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (“Trial by jury is the normal and . . .
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases.”), abrogated on other grounds,
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
210
Id. at 312. See generally KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7 (2019).
211
WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE: QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 4 (noting that recent studies suggest that
“appellate courts have shown an increasing tendency to grant qualified immunity . . . . [in]
57 percent [of] excessive force cases decided from 2017 to 2019”); Andrew Chung et al., For
Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/ [https://perma.cc
/NBX8-MBUZ] (comparing grants of qualified immunity in favor of police between 2005–2007
and 2017–2019). Unsurprisingly, the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity in 64% of its
cases while the Ninth Circuit “granted just 42% of police requests for qualified immunity.”
Debra Cassens Weiss, Which Appeals Court Is Most Likely to Grant Qualified Immunity to
Police?, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 25, 2020, 12:17 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/ar
ticle/grants-of-qualified-immunity-to-police-vary-widely-by-appeals-court [https://perma.cc
/8CNJ-7UGQ].
212
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
213
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (noting that the Constitution “divides power
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is
considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others . . . .”).

2022]

SOLIDIFYING SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY

591

also said that “[w]ere the federal government to take over the regulation of the entire
areas of traditional state concern . . . the boundaries between the sphere of federal
and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”214
Some, like former Solicitor General Seth Waxman, argue that granting Supremacy Clause immunity in cases where a federal officer clearly exceeds his authority
reads the federal interest too narrowly and overstates the state interest at stake.215
While it is true that States should not be able to “retard, impede, burden, or in any
matter control”216 the federal government, this truth does not give federal officials
the power to obviate state criminal law. Waxman argues that the “integrity of federal
law depends on its sound execution, which in turn depends on the actions of federal
officers.”217 Consequentially, he believes that, like the policy aims of qualified immunity, federal officers should be protected against the fear of personal liability that
might “unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”218 This view,
however, fails to consider the Supreme Court’s consistent stance that the “Framers
recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were
critical to preserving liberty.”219 Where federal law enforcement officers have
arguably abused their authority,220 the States have a vested interest in not only
enforcing their own laws but also in protecting the sanctity of the system of government. Federal officers should not be given a “get out of jail free card” merely
because they are enforcing federal law, especially where they have clearly exceeded
their authority.
Likewise, making federal officers accountable to states through juries does not
overstate the state interest at stake. States, of course, do not have a license to arrest
federal officers like Agent Schrader, simply to inhibit the federal government from
enforcing federal law. But federal officers should think twice about how they
execute those duties and should be cognizant of the state in which they are performing those duties. And, where state and federal law conflict on how to enforce the
law, only federal officers acting within the bounds of their authority should be able
to bypass state law. Waxman argues that the Constitution “did not confer the
214

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577.
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2251.
216
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
217
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2251.
218
Id.
219
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986).
220
See Sinéad Baker, Black Lives Matter and the ACLU Are Suing the Trump Administration
for Forcing Peaceful Protestors Out of His Way with Tear Gas Before His Church Photo Op,
BUS. INSIDER (June 5, 2020, 6:46 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-photo-op
-black-lives-matter-aclu-sue-protest-clearing-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/6UDB-GTEK] (describing
the ACLU’s complaint which “asserts that the steps taken to ‘shut down the Lafayette Square
demonstration is the manifestation of the very despotism against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect.’”).
215
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authority to exercise . . . [its police power] against the federal government.”221 But
to essentially give the federal government cart blanche authority to do whatever it
wants contradicts what the Supreme Court has said and what the Framers attempted
to establish. For the Framers, the “solution to governmental power and its perils was
simple: divide it. To prevent the ‘gradual concentration’ of power in the same hands
they enabled ‘[a]mbition . . . to counteract ambition’ at every turn.”222 That is why
the Framers “split[] the atom of sovereignty” into the Federal Government and the
States.223
D. Adequacy of Other Protections for Federal Officers
Yet another argument in favor of judges deciding disputed issues of material fact
is that federal judges can guard against hostile state prosecutors—like the prosecutor
in our fictional case—who seek to interfere with the enforcement of federal law.224
At the competition, many of the judges were concerned with state prosecutors simply
alleging disputed issues of fact in order to force a trial.225 These concerns, while
valid, are not sufficient to interpose a judge between the state prosecutor and juries
because federal officers already enjoy significant protections besides the inherent
state law defenses.
1. Federal Officer Removal Statute
One of the strongest protections already afforded to federal officers is the Federal
Officer Removal Statute.226 The Federal Officer Removal Statute allows federal
221

Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2251.
Seila Law LLC, v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
223
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504
n.17 (1999)).
224
This was also of concern to the Ninth Circuit when it decided Horiuchi. See Idaho v.
Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 375 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[W]e believe interposing a federal
judge between the state prosecutor and the jury will provide a significant restraint on
overzealous state prosecutors and ensure such prosecutions remain an avenue of last resort
in our federal system.”). The issue has also been briefed as late as 2019. See Appellant’s
Reply Brief at 2, California v. Clay, 778 F. App’x 548 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.) (No. 18-55297),
2018 WL 6606017, at *2 (arguing that the state charges for perjury for applying for false
driver’s license was an “adequately alleged . . . colorable federal defense to the criminal charges
based on supremacy clause immunity and vindictive or selective prosecution” (citing United
States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982))).
225
See, e.g., Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 377 (providing an example of the kind of concerns
judges have about the forcing of trials in these kinds of cases).
226
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
222
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officers the power to remove any “civil action or criminal prosecution that is
commenced in a State Court and that is against” the United States or a federal agency
or any federal officer “act[ing] under color of such office” to the district court “embracing the place wherein [the action] is pending.”227 The statute was primarily
enacted “to protect the Federal Government from the interference with its ‘operations’ that would ensue were a State able, for example to ‘arres[t]’ and bring ‘to trial
in a State cour[t] for an alleged offense against the law of the State.”228
This statute provides a number of important protections in Supremacy Clause
immunity cases.229 First, and most obvious, the statute replaces a state judge with a
federal judge.230 The idea here is that a federal judge, with life tenure, is not beholden to the state and its constituents.231 Therefore, a federal judge has the freedom,
without the pressures that an elected state judge would have, to fairly manage the
case, rule on motions, and conduct a trial. This also helps protect against other “perils”
that some scholars argue exist in state courts.232 Second, but less obvious, the statute
provides for a broader jury pool.233 In a pro-marijuana state, such as the fictional state
of New Tejas, pooling from juries in an entire district rather than from a local county
could draw a more diverse and representative jury. This claim is true because not all
counties in a state may be in favor of whatever state law is at issue.234 Last, the statute
227

Id. § 1442(a).
Watson v. Phillip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007) (alterations in original) (quoting
Willingham v. Jarvis, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969)).
229
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
230
Id. § 1442(a).
231
See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 8, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-fig
ures [https://perma.cc/DAX5-S7PV] (noting that thirty-nine states “use some form of election
at some level of court”).
232
See Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court
Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial”
and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in
Federal and State Courts, 1925–2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 436 (2012) (noting
that some defendants “often accuse state courts of being incompetent to decide mixed federal
and state controversies”).
233
See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 387, 421 (1992) (noting
28 U.S.C. § 1442 allows removal outside those normally available to parties, thereby providing a more diverse jury pool and discussing the importance of jury selection generally as a
considerable motivating factor behind removal actions). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
234
See German Lopez, Live Results for 2020’s Marijuana Legalization Ballot Measures,
VOX (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:29 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/11/3/2154
6635/marijuana-legalization-ballot-measures (noting voting variations for states with legalization
propositions on the 2020 ballot); see also California Proposition 64—Legalize Marijuana—
Results: Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elec
tions/2016/results/california-ballot-measure-64-legalize-marijuana (noting that nearly 43%
228
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increases the odds that a different prosecutor altogether would be involved in the
relevant litigation,235 which could control for bias on the part of the prosecutor.
2. Appeals
Like qualified immunity,236 federal officers who are denied Supremacy Clause
immunity may lodge an interlocutory appeal.237 That is, if a federal officer was denied
Supremacy Clause immunity in district court, he or she could immediately file an
interlocutory appeal.238 If the federal officer lost the appeal and also lost at trial, he
or she could also appeal the jury verdict.239 In the vast majority of cases, however, the
state appeals because Supremacy Clause immunity is granted more often than it is
denied.240 Regardless, the right to an interlocutory appeal acts as an additional shield
voted against legalization). The Central District of California, for example, had counties that
voted in favor and against legalization. See id.
235
See Dan Schweitzer, Who Argues for the States in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 2 NAT’L
ASS’N ATT’YS GEN. (2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20200726182347/https://www.naag
.org/publications/nagtri-journal/volume-2-issue-4/who-argues-for-the-states-in-the-u.s.-su
preme-court.php [https://perma.cc/JZ2X-39HE] (noting that at the Supreme Court, most
cases are argued by state solicitor generals). In fact, some county district attorney’s offices
have entirely different divisions in charge of federal cases. See, e.g., DALLAS COUNTY,
https://www.dallascounty.org/government/district-attorney/divisions/federal.php [https://
perma.cc/JLU8-LT5G] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022); About the Office of the Maryland Attorney
General, MARYLAND ATT’Y GEN. OFF., https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages
/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/EN5N-8YAU] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (noting that the
“Criminal Appeals Division represents the State in all criminal matters” in the federal courts
at all levels); Divisions, ALABAMA ATT’Y GEN. OFF., https://www.alabamaag.gov/Divisions
[https://perma.cc/G8K3-PSFS] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (describing Alabama’s “Constitutional Defense” Division which handles cases in state and federal courts).
236
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (holding that defendants claiming
qualified immunity may file an interlocutory appeal both on motions to dismiss and motions
for summary judgment); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (“[W]e hold that a
district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity . . . is an appealable “final decision.”).
237
See Brief of Appellant at 8, Virgin Islands v. Clark (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 093569), 2010
WL 4851705, at *8 (noting that the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal when the territorial court denied Supremacy Clause immunity on the grounds that it was inapplicable to
the Virgin Islands).
238
See Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1216–26 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting Supremacy
Clause immunity is an issue capable of interlocutory appeal and mentioning Supremacy Clause
immunity denials are reviewed de novo); New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding one of the purposes of Supremacy Clause immunity is to have cases decided
quickly and prevent the chilling effect of state law, thereby justifying interlocutory appeals).
239
See, e.g., State v. Deedy, 407 P.3d 164, 188 (Haw. 2017) (appealing a jury verdict partially
on grounds of Supremacy Clause immunity).
240
See Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Neagle v.
Cunningham, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890); Livingston, 443 F.3d at 1211; Tanella, 374 F.3d, at 142)
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for a federal officer even if juries are allowed to decide disputed issues of material fact.
This gives the federal officer two bites at the apple, just like with qualified immunity.
3. Supremacy Clause Immunity Burden Shifting Framework
Last, but more hidden, is the inherent benefit of the burden shifting framework
for disputed issues of material fact embedded in Supremacy Clause immunity cases.
During the moot competition, judges were keen to ask what would prevent a state
prosecutor from manufacturing disputed issues of fact to move the case forward to
trial. The same question was also at the forefront of the Ninth Circuit in Horiuchi.241
Manufacturing or simply alleging disputed issues, however, is easier said than done.
In the limited case law, it is practically unheard of for two reasons. First, “manufacturing” a statement of fact or failing to “correct a false statement of material fact”
violates ethics rules.242 Second, Federal officers asserting Supremacy Clause immunity must first show that their actions were necessary and proper by “so great a
preponderance of evidence . . . [and only] if there is a substantial conflict of evidence as to basic or controlling facts the Federal Court should refuse to” grant the
immunity.243 That substantial conflict is key. Contrary to what the moot judges and
Ninth Circuit alleged,244 state prosecutors would not be able to simply manufacture
any disputed issue of fact; rather, they would have to put forth evidence “sufficient
at least to raise a genuine factual issue whether the federal officer . . . was doing no
more than what was necessary and proper.”245 Put differently, mere allegations of
disputed facts are not enough to overcome a Rule 12 motion to dismiss.246 This
(“[F]ederal officials are generally granted Supremacy Clause immunity from state prosecution . . . .”).
241
See Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 376 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“As experience
with qualified immunity cases shows, if merely presenting a disputed issue of fact were sufficient to get to a jury, then state prosecutions of federal agents could become quite common.
Such prosecutions—whether successful or not—place a heavy burden on the agent charged
and the agency that employs him.”).
242
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (A.B.A. 2019); see also id. r. 3.1 (“A
lawyer shall not bring . . . or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .”).
243
Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (emphasis added). Note, this was
a federal habeas case but the same standard of evidence seems to remain the norm today as
evidenced in the Kleinert decision. See Texas v. Kleinert, 143 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557 (W.D.
Tex. 2015), aff’d 855 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2017).
244
See Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 376.
245
Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 752 (6th Cir. 1988).
246
See Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[O]nce a defendant
raises the defense of Supremacy Clause immunity the burden shifts to the state to supply
sufficient evidence to raise a ‘genuine factual issue’ that is supported by more than mere
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standard has proven quite difficult for state prosecutors to surmount because, while
disputed issues of fact may be common, they are largely irrelevant in that they have
generally not involved material facts surrounding the immunity issue.247
Ultimately, our recommendation that juries rather than judges should decide
disputed issues of material fact could be handled via Congressional legislation.248
Congress could, and perhaps should, codify statutes to address this issue like they did
with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)249 and the Citizens Protection Act (CPA).250
In contrast to Waxman, both of these laws suggest an approach to the “judge-jury”
issue that favors greater state involvement and authority to enforce state laws over
federal officers.251 Under the FTCA, for instance, civil suits against the government
and federal officers for tort violations are analyzed under state law “where the act or
omission occurred.”252 To be sure, FTCA claims that proceed to trial are “generally
‘tried by the court without a jury.’”253 But, even FTCA cases allow for “advisory
juries” to render non-binding verdicts.254 And courts have increasingly employed
“advisory juries” to serve as fact-finders.255 If Congress was concerned with state
allegations.” (second emphasis added) (citing Long, 443 F.3d at 752)); City of Jackson v.
Jackson, 235 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
247
See, e.g., New York v. Tanella, 374 F. 3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the relative
positions of a FDA officer and a suspect were not material to whether the officer acted reasonably under the second prong of the Supremacy Clause immunity test). In the roughly fiftythree Supremacy Clause immunity cases, there are only three that we are aware of where
disputed issues of fact were material to the immunity issue. See United States ex rel. Drury
v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 232 (1906) (finding there was a genuine dispute of whether a fleeing
suspect surrendered before the federal officer shot him); Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 728,
729–30 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding a material dispute whether federal officers were intoxicated
and thus acting within the scope of their duties); Birsch v. Tumbleson, 31 F.2d 811, 812–13
(4th Cir. 1929) (affirming district court’s dismissal of a federal game warden’s habeas petition
because of conflicting evidence whether hunters were pointing weapons at him).
248
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2243 (citing Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295
(1988)) (noting that the statutory arrangement of the Federal Tort Claims Act is illustrative
of “the extent to which state law may constrain federal officers is ultimately up to Congress”).
249
28 U.S.C. § 2674.
250
Id. § 530B.
251
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2245 (arguing that “in the absence of express
congressional instruction . . . . a measure of officer immunity akin to qualified immunity is
necessary to ensure that federal law and policy is effectuated free from state interference”).
252
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
253
LEWIS, supra note 210 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2402) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 22 (1980)).
254
Matthew L. Zabel, Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in Federal Tort Claims
Act Cases, 2003 BYU L. REV. 185, 205 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 10,092 (1946) (statement of
Rep. Scrivner)).
255
Id. at 193 (“[C]ourts have increasingly chosen to impanel advisory juries in FTCA
cases.”); see also Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (ordering an advisory jury to be empaneled).
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overreach, it could have written distinct federal standards rather than relying on state
law. Moreover, under the CPA, federal government attorneys are “subject to State
laws and rules . . . governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages
in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.”256 Again, Congress chose to subject federal employees to state
law. Permitting juries to decide disputed issues of material fact allows states—
through their citizens and prosecutors—to better enforce their laws against rogue
federal officers. This methodology is congruent with how Congress has handled
federal employee/agency violations of state laws in the civil and ethical contexts.
III. THE PROPER SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY TEST
Procedural issues aside, the next question is: what test governs whether a federal
officer is protected by Supremacy Clause immunity? The Supreme Court gave us
a starting point. First, courts look to whether the federal officer was performing an
act that federal law authorized such officer to perform. Second, courts ask whether
the officer’s actions were necessary and proper to fulfilling his or her federal duties.257
But this test is incomplete and has resulted in a patchwork of responses from lower
courts.258 As Waxman explains, courts and practitioners have formulated various
positions as to how much protection Supremacy Clause immunity should provide,
ranging from minuscule protection to absolute immunity.259 Unlike Waxman and the
Ninth Circuit assert, Supremacy Clause immunity should not provide the same scope
of protection as qualified immunity and Bivens.260 While this equation is helpful, it
256

28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890).
258
Many courts, for example, have debated the meaning of “necessary and proper.”
Compare Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven though his acts may
have exceeded his express authority, this did not necessarily strip [him] of his lawful power
to act under the scope of authority given to him under the laws of the United States.”) and
In re McShane, 235 F. Supp. 262, 275 (N.D. Miss. 1964) (granting immunity for discretionary
decision to use tear gas), and Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1227–28 (10th Cir.
2006) (“[T]he question is not whether federal law expressly authorizes violation of state law,
but whether the federal official’s conduct was reasonably necessary . . . .”), with North
Carolina v. Cisneros, 947 F.2d 1135, 1139 (4th Cir. 1991) (granting Supremacy Clause
immunity for reckless driving in off-duty traffic accident because “the accident resulted from
an exigency or emergency related to his federal duties which dictated or constrained the way
in which he was required to, or could, carry out those duties.” (emphasis added)), and Puerto
Rico v. Torres Cahparro, 738 F. Supp. 620, 621 (D.P.R. 1990), aff’d 922 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1991)
(granting Supremacy Clause immunity because “the order required [the federal officer] to
proceed as fast as possible” (emphasis added)).
259
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2238–39 (discussing the diverging views
in the Horiuchi briefs).
260
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2239.
257
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is not precise,261 and it leaves unanswered questions. First, how does the Court determine whether an action was authorized? Second, how does one determine whether
action was necessary and proper? Last, should the necessary and proper prong also
include the “clearly established by law” test, and if so what sources of law should be
considered in that analysis? This Article proposes clarifications and alterations to
the equation to answer these questions and define the outer boundaries of the
immunity to avoid the complications associated with qualified immunity.
A. The Meaning of “Authorized”
The first prong of the Supremacy Clause immunity tests asks whether the
federal officer was authorized to act under federal law.262 There is generally no debate as to the meaning of “authorized.”263 And most federal officers will likely meet
this first prong of the test so long as they can point to a federal statute that gives
them the power to carry out an action.264 So, Agent Schrader, despite being on
vacation, and despite his primary job of enforcing white collar crimes, would meet
this prong simply by pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 3052, which permits agents of the FBI
to “make arrests without [a] warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United
States.”265 Because marijuana is a controlled substance under federal law266 and
because possession of a controlled substance is a felony,267 Agent Schrader would
be “authorized” to carry out the arrest.
That said, there are rare situations where federal officers will not be saved even
if they point to a federal law granting them authorization. It turns out—like property
values in real estate—that determining whether a federal officer was authorized turns
on “location, location, location.”268 For instance, if Agent Schrader was vacationing in
261

See Wallace, supra note 6, at 1514–15 (discussing three subtle differences between
Supremacy Clause immunity and qualified immunity).
262
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2237 (noting the first prong of the Supremacy
Clause immunity test).
263
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2234–38.
264
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890) (“In the view we take of the Constitution
of the United States, any obligation fairly and properly inferrible [sic] from that instrument,
or any duty . . . to be derived from the general scope of his duties under the laws of the
United States, is ‘a law’ within the meaning of th[e] phrase.”).
265
18 U.S.C. § 3052.
266
See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ means a drug or other substance . . . included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this title.”); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10)
(listing marijuana as a schedule I drug).
267
See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant
to a valid prescription . . . .”).
268
William Safire, Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 26, 2009), https://
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a U.S. territory, he could not claim that he was authorized to execute federal law.269
The rationale here is that unincorporated territories are not always preempted by the
Constitution, therefore, unless preemption applies, a federal officer cannot claim
Supremacy Clause immunity.270 Although preemption can exist in U.S. territories,
it “is not pursuant to the ‘Supremacy Clause’”271 because U.S. territories already
“march[] to the beat of a single sovereign drum major—Congress.”272
B. The Two-Step Necessary and Proper Dance
Most mysterious is what the Supreme Court meant by “necessary and proper.”273
Courts are split on whether necessity includes both mandatory and discretionary actions.274 Moreover, some courts have included subjective intent while others only use
objective reasonableness.275 And while most courts agree that some variant of “fair
notice” is required, like with qualified immunity, none have affirmatively outlined
what sources of law provide fair notice in Supremacy Clause immunity cases.276
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine/28FOB-onlanguage-t.html (crediting the phrase
“location, location, location” to Lord Harold Samuel, a real estate tycoon in Britain).
269
See Virgin Islands v. Clark, 53 V.I. 183, 205 (Super. Ct. 2010) (holding that Supremacy
Clause immunity is inapplicable in U.S. territories).
270
Id. at 203 (holding that the Supremacy Clause did not preempt laws in the Virgin
Islands because “Supremacy Clause” was omitted from the Revised Organic Act of 1954).
271
Id. at 200.
272
Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
168 (1899) (holding that the Virgin Islands is an instrumentality of the U.S. government); Binns
v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491–92 (1904) (stating that Congress has plenary power within
the U.S. Territories).
273
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 1500–02 (expressing confusion at the “necessary and proper” language in the Supremacy Clause immunity test); see also Randy Barnett,
Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745 (1997) (discussing the historical context of and
competing views surrounding the Necessary and Proper Clause).
274
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 277–78 (1993); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 343 (1769) (“[T]he
truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal,
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s]
equals and neighbors . . . .”).
275
Compare Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1977) (including both a subjective and objective reasonableness element), with Wyoming v. Livingston, 43 F.3d 1211,
1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (expressing “concer[n] with the incorporation of a subjective element
into the reasonableness of a federal officer’s actions”). Some scholars have classified this as
a “willfulness v. reasonableness” debate. See Wallace, supra note 6, at 1528–29 (arguing that
“Congress should codify Supremacy Clause immunity” and require a willfulness standard
instead of a reasonableness standard).
276
See Wallace, supra note 6, at 1531; Livingston, 43 F.3d at 1220.
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1. The Meaning of “Necessary”: Mandatory v. Discretionary
The first subpart of the “necessary and proper” prong examines whether the
federal officer’s actions were necessary. But when is an action “necessary” for
purposes of Supremacy Clause immunity? This question plagued judges at the moot
competition and has been debated in actual case law. In our view, courts on one end
of the spectrum have been too rigid finding “necessary” to mean only mandatory
actions. Other courts, however, have been too lax including broad discretionary
actions. The better approach lies somewhere in the middle. In a purely mandatory
world, federal officers likely would be chilled because they would fear acting
without specific instructions or a statute directing them. And because the federal
government “can act only through its officers and agents[] and they must act within
the States,”277 this view would suppress the federal government. On the opposite end
of the spectrum, merely pointing to a statutory authority is not enough. Not only
does that conflate the “authority” prong with the “necessary” prong, it also provides
too much protection for officers, like Agent Schrader, and opens up opportunities
for rogue federal officers to exploit Supremacy Clause immunity without limits. For
example, providing protection for an officer for actions contrary to established
agency policy and regulations. In short, the proper definition of mandatory provides
flexibility for “heat of the moment” decision-making and emergency situations if the
federal officer is required to carry out the action.
There is no question that Supremacy Clause immunity protects a federal officer
who acts at the direct order of a superior. As Chief Justice Marshall said: “An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual,
to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order. His security is implied
in the order itself.”278 This is not to say that the inclusion of protection for discretionary actions is unsupported.279 The Supreme Court has said that: “To employ the
means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means.”280 There
should be, however, an “outer perimeter”281 to protections for discretionary actions
because “[a]n act cannot simultaneously be necessary to the execution of a duty . . .
and a[] [criminal] offense to the laws of a state.”282 To be fair, courts that have found
277

Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879).
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 865 (1824).
279
See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (“[T]he concept of duty encompasses the
sound exercise of discretionary authority.”).
280
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413–14 (1819) (emphasis added).
281
See Barr, 360 U.S. at 575 (“The fact that the action here taken was within the outer
perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable . . . .”).
282
Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1347 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Arizona v.
Files, 36 F. Supp. 3d 873, 878 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Colorado v. Symes, 386 U.S. 510, 518
278
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discretionary actions protected by Supremacy Clause immunity have said that it
would not protect against deliberate violations of state law or where a federal officer
“acted because of any personal interest, malice, actual criminal intent, or for any
other reason than to do his duty as he saw it.”283 But this limitation bleeds into the
“objective v. subjective” debate, and, as discussed below,284 subjectivity should not
be a part of Supremacy Clause immunity. Thus, clearer limitations are needed to
define the perimeter of the immunity.
What these “clearer limitations” should look like is open to debate. One author
of this Article, Justin Van Orsdol, proposes that, outside of emergencies or direct
commands from a superior, a federal officer’s actions are “necessary” if the officer
is: (1) on duty,285 (2) in the jurisdiction where they are assigned (either temporarily
or permanently), (3) executing a federal law that they have directly been tasked
with, and (4) acting in line with agency regulations or guidance.286 His concern lies
in officers overextending their authority where state officers would or could better
handle the situation.
Judge Gardner, the other author of this Article, proposes that the fourth element
is a sufficient limitation, as the first three could operate to dissuade federal agents
from appropriately confronting crime outside of their set duty-hours, jurisdiction, or
current job focus. Many federal agents, like FBI agents “[i]n the U.S. and its territories,”287 are authorized to “make arrests for any federal offense committed in their presence or when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed, or is committing, a felony violation of U.S. laws.”288 The charge of federal agents is, by definition, broader than that of state and local authorities to whom
such restrictions might appropriately apply. But federal agents are charged to
(1932)) (“While the case law does not endorse an ‘anything goes’ approach to fixing the
authority of federal officers, it does not limit the defense to actions specifically directed by
statute or by rule.”).
283
Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
284
See infra Section III.B.2.
285
Justin would also allow federal officers who “slip[] into [their] police roles” to respond
to emergencies qualify as on duty, such as violent crimes and threats to life and bodily injury.
See Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1432–33 (10th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted),
vacated sub nom. City of Lawson v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985). We would not allow immunity
where a federal officer was acting under a separate employer. See, e.g., Traver v. Meshriv,
627 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1980) (assuming that qualified immunity would apply to an off-duty
police officer working as security at bank).
286
This would include actions taken “in any manner contrary to [agency] rules and regulations” or policy. LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR FBI SPECIAL AGENTS, FED. BUREAU INV., 5 (2003).
287
What Authority Do FBI Special Agents Have to Make Arrests in the United States, Its
Territories, or on Foreign Soil?, FED. BUREAU INV., https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what
-authority-do-fbi-special-agents-have-to-make-arrests-in-the-united-states-its-territories-or
-on-foreign-soil [https://perma.cc/64S3-RKCW].
288
Id.
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enforce national laws even if they are temporarily assigned to a specific jurisdiction.289 To withdraw the protection of the Supremacy Clause based on the time
of day or the location of the officer is impractical and would act to dissuade agents
from fully discharging their sworn duties. Moreover, Justin’s first three proposed
limitations do not take into account the practicalities of the work and career of a
federal agent. In addition to frequently changing duty stations, federal officers often
change areas of expertise and focus. For example, a federal officer may start out
investigating violent crime in Washington and later be reassigned to a section focusing
on complex business crimes based in Georgia. While they may no longer be working
in a section directly tasked with addressing violent crime in Washington, the agent
retains the knowledge and experience to effectively enforce those laws in Georgia.
Not to mention the fact that there frequently is overlap between types of crime.
Besides, while their main duties may shift, their overall responsibility and oath to
enforce federal law does not.290 Finally, regardless of whether they are technically
on duty, in their assigned jurisdiction, or if the crime witnessed is in their current
assignment, the Constitution and laws of the United States, along with agency
regulations, like standard operating procedures or policy memorandums, operate to
effectively limit agents.291 Thus, a requirement that they must be operating within
these is sufficient to establish the contours of what is “necessary.”
An officer acting within these boundaries (either under Judge Gardner’s or
Justin’s version) could still invoke Supremacy Clause immunity while having
limited discretionary freedom, subject to the “proper” prong. Either formulation
balances the concerns from both ends of the spectrum by curtailing would-be rogue
federal officers and thawing the chilling effect that a “mandatory only actions” test
would create. They also have the added benefit of preventing federal officers from
acting contrary to agency policies or rules thereby preserving agency flexibility and
resources in enforcing federal law.292 So, under either formulation, Agent Schrader’s
289

See What Tasks Do FBI Agents Typically Perform?, FED. BUREAU INV., https://www
.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-does-an-fbi-agent-do-on-a-typical-day [https://perma.cc/XS5B-RDUP]
(“Special agents are always on call to protect their country and may be transferred at any
time, based on the needs of the FBI.”).
290
All federal employees, including federal law enforcement, swear an oath of office prior
to starting employment. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Rudd, Our Oath of Office, FED. BUREAU INV.
(Sept. 2009), https://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2009/september2009/oath.htm [https://
perma.cc/Z3W9-N38S] (quoting the oath and describing its origins and meaning).
291
See, e.g., Memorandum from Claire M. Grady, Acting Deputy Sec’y of Homeland
Sec., Department Policy on the Use of Force (Sept. 7, 2018) (requiring DHS officers to first
identify themselves and give a verbal warning, similar to New Tejas’ law, limiting when and
how firearms can be discharged, and informing officers that violate DHS policy that they will
be subject to both administrative and criminal penalties).
292
See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], https://
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arrest would not be “necessary” because he was acting contrary to official agency
policy.293
2. The Meaning of “Proper”: Objective v. Subjective Reasonableness
The second subpart of the “necessary and proper” prong looks to whether the
federal officer’s actions were proper. Again, courts and scholars have diverged as
to the meaning of proper.294 Waxman, for instance, argues that a subjective inquiry
and an objective analysis are required.295 Others, like James Wallace, argue that
courts should adopt a pure willfulness standard.296 The authors of this Article, however, favor a third approach, arguing that an officer should be protected only if his
or her actions were objectively proper—like qualified immunity but with a caveat.
The caveat is a narrower interpretation of what is objectively proper under the
“clearly established law” prong, which is discussed below.297
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X2R
-8FLC] (guiding DOJ attorneys and law enforcement to “focus their enforcement resources
and efforts”).
293
At the time of the events in the hypothetical, the Cole Memo was in effect, which declared
that the “enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies
should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.” See id. Moreover,
Supreme Court precedent supports adding this element to definition of “necessary.” See
Wallace, supra note 6, at 1504 (citing Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); United States
ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 466–67 (1951)) (“[T]he Court’s precedent on the
relationship between federal law enforcement and their authority derived from statute . . .
reaffirms the Court’s commitment to the Supremacy Clause in an immunity context.”).
294
Compare Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (expressing
“concer[n] with the incorporation of a subjective element into reasonableness of a federal
officer’s actions”), with New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (“To meet
[the necessary and proper prong], two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the actor must subjectively believe that his action is justified; and (2) that belief must be objectively reasonable”
(citations omitted)).
295
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2202 (“Accordingly, we argue that federal officers acting within the scope of their employment should be immune from state prosecution
for taking any action that they reasonably believe is necessary and proper to the performance
of their federal functions. Properly applied, this standard is effectively coextensive with
qualified immunity.”).
296
Wallace, supra note 6, at 1530–31 (“Either the Supremacy Clause control, leaving the
judge to determine whether the officer acted willfully, or the court must shift to the reasonableness standard, with potentially devastating consequences.”). Note, Wallace argues that
“Supremacy Clause immunity resembles sovereign immunity more than qualified immunity,”
which explains his argument against a reasonableness standard. Id. at 1531. The Supreme
Court’s creation of the Neagle test, which more resembles qualified immunity, casts doubt
on this argument.
297
See infra Section III.B.3.
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The Supreme Court eliminated the subjective intent inquiry in civil suits because
it was unworkable with the aims of qualified immunity.298 And qualified immunity
standards have already applied to federal officers.299 Further, a version of qualified
immunity has been applied in criminal cases.300 Because our Supremacy Clause immunity test is based upon qualified immunity, requiring a subjective intent analysis
in Supremacy Clause immunity cases would be inconsistent with qualified immunity
precedent and would create incongruent protections for federal and state officers—
despite the presence of similar social and financial costs.
Although Supremacy Clause immunity is not jurisdictional and operates more
like a defense than immunity from suit altogether, an inquiry into an officer’s subjective state of mind creates “substantial costs,” which would undoubtedly “entail
broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s
professional colleagues.”301 A subjective inquiry would create a situation where
nearly every Supremacy Clause immunity case would have to go to the jury because
“an official’s subjective good faith has been considered a question of fact . . .
regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.”302 Put differently, a subjective
inquiry would create a situation where a nefarious state prosecutor could manufacture
disputed issues of material fact, which is precisely what federal officers asserting
Supremacy Clause immunity want to avoid.
Additionally, most Supremacy Clause immunity claims arise out of excessive
force scenarios which implicate the Fourth Amendment.303 And including subjective
intent is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment precedent. The Supreme Court has
already held that “excessive force [violations] in the course of making an arrest . . .
are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’
standard.”304 Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that “an arresting officer’s state
298

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1982) (“The subjective element of
the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition . . . that
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.”).
299
See id. at 807 (“For executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that
qualified immunity represents the norm.”).
300
See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (applying a heightened
version of qualified immunity standards to a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 242). Even when
analyzing “willfulness” under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the Supreme Court required an objective
analysis. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945) (“And in determining whether
that requisite bad purpose was present the jury would be entitled to consider all the attendant
circumstances . . . .”).
301
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–17.
302
Id. at 816.
303
See, e.g., Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977); In re McShane, 235 F. Supp.
262 (N.D. Miss. 1964).
304
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 7–22 (1985) (analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness” standard).
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of mind . . . is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause”305 And the legal justification for making an arrest is not invalidated because of an officer’s state of mind.306
Moreover, Courts that have included a subjective inquiry in Supremacy Clause
immunity cases did so before the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald,307
or do not bother to distinguish Harlow.308
Wallace’s inclusion of a willfulness standard and Waxman’s inclusion of a
reasonable belief standard do address the issue, but to rely solely on willfulness or
to include reasonable belief creates an unnecessary strain on the judicial system,
federal officers, and the state to try to prove an officer’s subjective intent at the
Supremacy Clause immunity stage of the case.309 Interestingly, Wallace critiques
Waxman’s reasonableness standard for essentially the same reason.310 To be sure,
if the state prosecutor has evidence showing a federal officer acted with criminal
intent, “the officer’s conduct [would] certainly fall outside the scope of the [Supremacy Clause immunity] defense.”311 This is not say that an officer will always evade
an inquiry into his or her intent,312 it only means that this inquiry is postponed until
305

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citing Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 523 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (per curiam)).
306
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (1996) (“[T]he legal justification for the officer’s action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action.” (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). Compare Seiner v. Drenon,
304 F.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding it was objectively reasonable for an officer to
shoot a suspect even though he had a mistaken understanding that the suspect shot him), with
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1286 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding it was objectively unreasonable to shoot an unarmed man).
307
See, e.g., Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 1977). Clifton was decided five
years before Harlow.
308
See Arizona v. Files, 36 F. Supp. 3d 873 (D. Ariz. 2014). While the Files court stated
that the “necessary and proper” test included a subjective component, it proceeded to state that
“a state opposing a Supremacy Clause immunity defense need not necessarily show the federal
officer acted with malice.” Id. at 878 (citing Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 2001)).
309
See, e.g., Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan and
Brooklyn Criminal Cases, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 524 (2014) (explaining
the wasted costs and legal resources during suppression hearings in criminal cases); Jenia I.
Turner, Managing Digital Discovery in Criminal Cases, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
237, 249–60 (explaining the time and costs associated with obtaining and storing digital
discovery in criminal cases).
310
See Wallace, supra note 6, at 1528 (arguing that the Waxman and Morrison reasonableness standard is inadequate because it “places immunity at the mercy of detailed factual
investigations”).
311
Files, 36 F. Supp 3d. at 878; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1317
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“We have understood Harlow to allow inquiry into motive where a bad one
could transform an official’s otherwise reasonable conduct into a constitutional tort.”
(citations omitted)).
312
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“This Court has never suggested
that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials
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after the immunity question is resolved and the case proceeds to trial for the underlying
criminal offense.313
Proving intent is often difficult, if not impossible, and could lead to federal officers escaping liability where they otherwise may not under an objective inquiry.314
Take, for example, § 1983 cases against municipalities for negligent hiring of police
officers.315 Courts deciding these cases often require plaintiffs to prove deliberate
intent, and as a result “have gradually narrowed the scope of liability for [] municipalit[ies].”316 Wallace is also correct that 18 U.S.C. § 242 codified a willfulness
standard for violations of federal law by federal officers and that there has been “no
claimed evidence of a rise in violations of constitutional rights.”317 But this argument
neglects to consider violations of state law, which is a different matter. Besides, the
Supreme Court already “drew a fine line between the role of subjective intent with
respect to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity—where it is irrelevant—
and the role of subjective intent with respect to the elements of a constitutional
violation—where it remains a vital element of certain civil rights suits.”318 The
also place them beyond the reach of criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil
immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of 18 U.S.C. § 242 . . . .”).
313
Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would
adopt an approach that allows the Court to determine what order to decide the case. That is,
whether there was a violation of state law or whether Supremacy Clause immunity applied.
Given the difference in outcomes between qualified immunity and Supremacy Clause immunity (i.e., damages v. prison time) we suspect the Court would not adopt the standard in
Pearson v. Callahan which allows courts to decide which order to resolve these questions.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009) (holding that the procedure required in
Saucier v. Katz was no longer mandatory). If the Supreme Court did allow courts to choose
the order perhaps a willfulness standard or a reasonable belief standard would be appropriate.
314
Subjective intent is also easily bypassed. For example, in employment discrimination
context, employees have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer’s constitutionally impermissible reason was a motivating factor for an adverse
decision. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). To
escape liability, employers can point to essentially any other valid reason for making their
decision. See Harris v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996). Subjective intent also opens the door for disputed issues of material fact. See id. (concluding
there were genuine issues of material fact as to the employer’s intent (citing Pearson v. MaconBibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 1992))).
315
Daylene A. Marsh, Guilty or Not: Municipal Liability for Negligent Hiring of Police
Officers, 14 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 69 (1989).
316
Id. at 82.
317
Wallace, supra note 6, at 1529; see also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (“Whoever, under color of
any law . . . willfully subjects any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States [shall be
guilty of a crime].”).
318
Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity:
Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective
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“[s]ocial costs that adequately justified the elimination of the subjective component
of an affirmative defense do not necessarily justify serious limitations upon ‘the only
realistic’ remedy for the violation of constitutional guarantees.”319 “We are obviously not free to add a ‘malice’ requirement where the Supreme Court has not done
so, nor would such an addition be warranted.”320 If subjective intent is irrelevant in
the qualified immunity context, it is equally irrelevant in the Supremacy Clause
immunity context.
3. Clearly Established, if so by What Kind of Law?
The last question is whether courts should include qualified immunity’s “clearly
established [by federal] law” prong.321 One argument against its inclusion is that qualified immunity is a common-law doctrine derived from the Supreme Court’s view of
the law when § 1983 was enacted.322 Conversely, Supremacy Clause immunity is
derived from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution323—the only thing the two
doctrines share is the word “immunity.” The Authors believe, as do Waxman and
Wallace, that some sort of “fair warning” is required. As both scholars explain, the
Supreme Court has established this requirement broadly and applied it to the
criminal context under § 242.324 In United States v. Lanier, the Court explained that:
The fact that one has a civil and the other a criminal role is of no
significance; both serve the same objective, and in effect the
Intent That Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 893 (1998) (emphasis omitted). Segregating the subjective inquiry in the immunity question from the violation
even occurs in cases where “malice” is part of the underlying violation, like in cases of malicious
prosecution. See, e.g., Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309–10 (6th Cir. 2010); Gallo v. City
of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d
178, 184 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996).
319
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591 (1998).
320
Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 366 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
321
Qualified Immunity, ABA (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public
_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-21/issue-1/qualified-immunity/
[https://perma.cc/H56V-YDG4].
322
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (“Where the
immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the time § 1983
was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights
Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity.”).
323
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
324
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2212 (“Although [the Supreme Court]
rejected the defendant’s particular fair warning defense, the Court actually gave the requirement
quite a broad scope.”); Wallace, supra note 6, at 1519 (“[W]e see that the Lanier Court
acknowledged that government officials require notice that their actions could result in
criminal prosecution, just as civil defendants require notice of potential civil liability.” (citing
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1997)).
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qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning
standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same
protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of criminal statutes.325
This disagreement resides with what constitutes “fair warning” or whether
something was “clearly established.”326 Waxman suggests that “a federal officer’s
entitlement to immunity from state criminal prosecution does not depend on an
assessment of his conduct under state law.”327 As a general rule, under Neagle328 and
Johnson v. Maryland,329 that is correct. But Waxman’s argument fails to consider
an exception that the Supreme Court did not account for when promulgating the
rule: federal officers authorized by, or acting under, the authority of state law.330
Recent events in Portland, Oregon provide an example of this exception.331 During
the Black Lives Matter protests of summer 2020, the federal government used
Customs and Border Protection officers to guard federal properties, including courthouses.332 But it was unclear whether these officers were strictly enforcing federal
law, or were enforcing state law.333 Oregon—like many states—authorizes federal
325

Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270–71 (1997). Note that 18 U.S.C. § 242's fair warning requirement
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s “clearly established” tests are not identical because § 242 is limited
to “willfulness” while § 1983 deals with “reasonableness.” They are, as a practical matter,
nearly identical. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002) (“[T]he ‘fair warning’ requirement
is identical under § 242 and . . . qualified immunity . . . . [We have] ‘upheld convictions
under . . . § 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the
cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the
conduct . . . at issue violated constitutional rights.”).
326
Id.
327
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 6, at 2234.
328
Neagle v. Cunningham, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (stating that an officer “cannot be guilty of a
crime under the law[s] of [a] State.”)
329
245 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1920) (“[E]ven the most unquestionable and most universally
applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the
conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the
United States.”).
330
See Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899) (“[W]hen discharging [their] duties
under Federal authority pursuant to and by virtue of valid Federal laws, [federal officers]
are not subject to arrest or other liability under the laws of the State in which their duties are
performed.” (emphasis added)).
331
See Trevor Bach, How Racist Policies Fostered Portland’s White Majority, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 9, 2020, 11:16 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-09-09/why
-portland-the-center-of-the-black-lives-matter-protests-is-so-white (noting that “anonymous
federal officers were detaining protestors off the streets”).
332
See Steve Vladeck, What the Heck Are Federal Law Enforcement Officers Doing in
Portland?, LAWFARE (July 17, 2020, 4:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-heck-are
-federal-law-enforcement-officers-doing-portland [https://perma.cc/6YD6-EAMD].
333
See id. (noting that it was “hardly obvious” which federal law the Customs and Border
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officers to enforce state law.334 Embedded in Oregon’s law granting this authorization is a limitation that “federal officer[s] may use physical force as is justifiable and
authorized under” other various Oregon statutes.335 Further, Oregon “requires state
certification that federal officers have received proper training before effectuating
arrests under state law before such arrests can happen” and it was unclear that this
process was followed.336 Oregon, and other states, should not be precluded from
prosecuting federal officers for violating state laws under these conditions because
functionally these officers are acting more like state officers. Thus, state law should
be considered under these circumstances.
Outside of this exception, relying on qualified immunity’s “clearly established
by federal law” prong leaves much to be desired. As Wallace critiques, “‘notice’ in
this sense, a warning that an individual may violate a law, ultimately depends on the
interpretation of reasonableness by the court.”337 Assuming the courts did utilize
qualified immunity’s current approach to the “clearly established” test, it becomes
clear that this critique is exaggerated for two reasons. First, most courts uphold
immunity the majority of the time. A recent study sampling district courts in Texas,
Florida, Ohio, California, and Pennsylvania found that qualified immunity was
denied only 31.6% of the time when raised via motion.338 In fact, the Supreme Court
has “continually reinforced a narrow definition of ‘clearly established,’ requiring
lower courts to accept as precedent only cases that have detailed circumstances very
similar to the case they are weighing.”339 And a court can “always manufacture a
factual distinction” between the case before it and prior cases.340 Consequently,
between 2017 and 2018, 57% of all excessive force cases were decided in favor of
officers because the there was no clearly established federal law.341 Second, under
Patrol agents were enforcing); see also Sergio Olmos, Mike Baker & Zolan Kanno-Youngs,
Federal Officers Deployed in Portland Didn’t Have Proper Training, D.H.S. Memo Said,
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/portland-protests.html
(noting that “[p]rotestors, along with videos posted on social media, have described scenes
of federal officers seizing people and pulling them into unmarked vans”).
334
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.245 (2019) (stating that a federal officer may arrest any person
“[f]or any crime committed in the federal officer’s presence if the federal officer has probable
cause to believe the person committed the crime”).
335
Id. §§ 133.245(3) (noting limitations in the following statutes: “ORS 161.235 (Use of
physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape), 161.239 (Use of deadly
physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape) and 161.245 (“Reasonable
belief” described).”).
336
Vladeck, supra note 332.
337
Wallace, supra note 6, at 1519 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71
(1997)).
338
Schwartz, supra note 16, at 36–37.
339
Chung et al., supra note 211.
340
McGarry v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1201 n.16 (D.N.M. 2018).
341
See Chung et al., supra note 211 (illustrating a shift in favor of police in qualified immunity cases decided on the “clearly established” prong).
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Pearson v. Callahan,342 the Supreme Court created a catch-22 because lower courts
are free to proceed to the clearly established prong “without first assessing whether
a defendant violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff.”343 The
Court’s overruling of the mandatory sequencing—of first deciding whether a constitutional violation had occurred under Saucier v. Katz344—has led to some rights
never becoming clearly established.345 At bottom, Wallace’s fear that federal officers
would somehow have less notice appears to be exaggerated.
Adopting a modified version of the clearly established test for Supremacy Clause
immunity not only would not have the real-life effect of decreasing notice to federal
officers, it also would give courts an opportunity to cure the maladies associated
with qualified immunity. Rather than only relying on circuit courts to define clearly
established violations, circuit courts should employ a number of tactics to better
define for what violations federal officers would be criminally liable.
First, all circuit courts should guide whether a violation is clearly established. This
is so because federal officers often work in a variety of jurisdictions, spanning multiple
states.346 This places all federal officers on the same footing and provides the same
notice, at least from the circuit courts, as to what qualifies as clearly established.
Also, such a standard provides consistency for federal agents who routinely move
around the country.
Second, federal officers should be held accountable if they violate federal directives, policy, or guidance memorandums that would affect the rights of third parties.
Federal officers are already on notice that they can be punished for actions that do not
“promote the efficiency of the service.”347 Arguably, attempting to exercise authority
342

See generally 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Schwartz, supra note 16, at 65.
344
See generally 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
345
See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2015) (describing the variation with which the Fifth Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits exercise discretion under Pearson to decide whether a constitutional violation has
occurred); Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468,
491–93 (2011) (finding that after Pearson district courts often answered both steps of the
qualified immunity test, but circuit courts more often moved to the clearly established step).
Cf. Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 623, 629 (2011) (finding that circuit courts followed the Saucier two-step process
“most of the time”).
346
For example, the FBI has fifty-six field offices, but not in every state. The Salt Lake
City, Utah, field office covers Utah, Idaho, and Montana, which would place it in both the
Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Likewise, the Kansas City, Missouri field office covers
both Missouri and Kansas—placing those officers under both the Tenth and Eighth Circuit’s
jurisdiction. See Field Offices, FED BUREAU INV., https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-of
fices (last visited Mar. 28, 2022) (scroll down to “filter by” and select a given state to see
what states are covered by each field office).
347
5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 735.203 (2006) (“An employee shall not engage
in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct
prejudicial to the government.”).
343
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contrary to agency practices, procedures, or guidance violates this tenant. Our proposal
simply heightens the severity of punishment from terminations and suspension to
criminal liability when courts and juries find it proper to do so. And, as discussed
above, this allows agencies to better control federal officers from going rogue, thereby
ensuring cohesiveness and efficiency.348 Besides, the Department of Justice has even
gone so far to emphasize that “[h]igher level employees and those entrusted with
sensitive responsibilities, including attorneys and law enforcement officers, are
subject to closer scrutiny and greater potential discipline[.]”349 Agencies are already
liable for not following their own regulations,350 and agencies must act through their
federal officers.351 Thus, it makes sense to subject federal officers to the same standard. This is especially true when one considers that citizens caught in enforcement
proceedings can be held accountable to non-binding agency guidance documents.352
Our proposal puts everyone on a level playing field then.
Lastly, under Supremacy Clause immunity, courts should still defer to the
sequencing under Saucier v. Katz353 unless: (1) the same constitutional question is
before a higher court; or (2) where a constitutional determination would require
interpretation of an ambiguous law. Further, in cases where there is limited factual
information, the authors would encourage courts to allow parties to engage in
limited discovery in order to guard against potential bad precedent.354 This gives
courts the flexibility to avoid the psychological pressure of cognitive dissonance that
often arises when a judge finds that there is a violation but that it was not clearly
established.355 Together, this would aid the courts in developing precedent to give
348

See supra Section III.B.1.
Memorandum from Lee J. Lofthus, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Admin., to all DOJ Employees, Off-Duty Conduct (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/file/1047651/download
[https://perma.cc/W2RB-4JNW].
350
See Sameena Inc. v. United States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The
Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide by the regulations
it promulgates.” (citations omitted)). Note that this requirement is less rigid when the policy
does not affect or is not intended to protect the interests of a party before an agency. See id.
(citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959); Note, Violations by Agencies of Their
Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629, 630 (1974)).
351
See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879) (noting that the federal government
“can act only through its officers and agents”).
352
See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical
Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. REGUL. 165, 166, 174 (2019) (concluding based
on empirical data that “regulated parties often face overwhelming practical pressure to follow
what a guidance document ‘suggests’” with the possibility of criminal punishment being one
of the greatest pressures).
353
533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
354
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 345, at 37 (describing these as arguments against
mandatory sequencing under Saucier).
355
See id. at 48 (describing the cognitive dissonance issue (citing Nancy Leong, The Qualified
Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 704–05 (2010))).
349
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federal officers fair warning while avoiding the pitfalls that normally come with the
mandatory sequencing under Saucier. Effectively, this makes Saucier the default
position, with the discretion to follow Pearson in certain circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Supremacy Clause immunity leaves courts at a crossroads. On one hand, “[a]n
agent acting . . . in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for
harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”356 And
it goes “without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent
his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public
good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause.”357 On the other hand,
exposing federal officers who violate state law to “the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”358 As Judge
Learned Hand put it, the correct path “must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative.”359 That is what our proposal aims to accomplish. While
it does not solve every foreseeable problem, it does provide a framework for courts
to address some of the procedural and substantive hurdles in way that balances competing constitutional concerns among stakeholders. In absence of legislation, the courts
must fashion a workable test to deal with what will likely be an increasing issue.
So, where does all of this leave Agent Schrader? First, on the procedural issue,
there would not be a disputed issue of material fact. With the elimination of the
subjective inquiry, the district court judge would be free to decide the Rule 12(b)
motion because there are no disputed material issues of fact that overlap between the
underlying state criminal charge and Supremacy Clause immunity. Second, under
the authority prong Agent Schrader’s decision to arrest Mr. White would have been
authorized. But, under the necessary and proper prong, Agent Schrader’s Supremacy
Clause immunity defense would likely fail under either of our definitions of “necessary” because: he was on vacation, outside of his jurisdiction, enforcing a law he
typically was not responsible for, and acted against department policy at the time.360
Moreover, his decision to tackle Mr. White would likely be improper because it was
both objectively unreasonable and likely would have violated clearly established
law. In sum, the State of New Tejas was well within its right to prosecute Agent
Schrader under its state criminal statutes.
356

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
357
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
Recall that, under Judge Gardner’s version, “necessary” is defined as acting within the
bounds of agency guidance, policy, and regulations. Only Justin’s version requires the first
three elements. See supra Section III.B.1.

